Agenda - Planning Commission - 02/02/2012

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October 25, 2011 I Volume 51 No. 20 Zoning Bulletin In April 2008, the court issued an order of judgment of $28,000 against Przekopski for 28 days of their violation of its order. Przekopski appealed. Among other .things, Przekopski argued that he could not be found in contempt of the stipulation because: (1) his activities constituted preexisting, nonconforming uses of the property protected by the laws of Connecticut; and (2) his activities constituted uses permitted as of right under the zoning regulations. DECISION: Affirmed in relevant part. The Appellate Court of Connecticut held that Przekopski, by entering into the stipulated judgment, waived his right to claim that his operations were permitted. The court explained that a stipulated judgment is defined "as a con- tract of the parties acknowledged in open court." The court said that, "in the absence of language evidencing an intent to preserve specific issues or claims for further litigation, it is presumed that the parties intended for the stipulated judgment to resolve all contested issues and claims raised in the record." In other words, in a stipulated judgment, the parties "waive their right to litigate issues involved in the case and thus save themselves the time, expense, and inevitable risk of litigation." In exchange for the saving of cost and elimination of risk, the parties "each give up something they might have won had they proceeded with the litigation." Both the arguments raised by Przekopski on appeal that his activities constituted preexisting, nonconforming uses of the property and/or uses per- mitted as of right were contested issues prior to the stipulated judgment. Rather than pursue these claims that the activities qualified as such uses, Przekopski entered into the stipulation and elected to have the court render the stipulated judgment. After reviewing the stipulation and the stipulated judgment, the appellate court found neither contained any language evidenc- ing the parties intended to preserve the issues as to whether the activities qualified as preexisting, nonconforming uses or uses permitted as of right. The court concluded by upholding the trial court's conclusion that Prze- kopski performed nonpermitted activities on his property in violation of the court's order. See also: Bank of Boston Connecticut v. DeGro f f, 31 Conn. App. 253, 624 A.2d 904 (1993). See also: Albert Mendel and Son, Inc. v. Krogh, 4 Conn. App. 117, 492 A.2d 536 (1985). 6 © 2011 Thomson Reuters