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November 25, 201 1 1 Voiume 5 I No. 22 Zoning Bulletin <br />DECISION: Judgment of district court affirmed in part, reversed in part, <br />and remanded. <br />The Supreme Court of Kansas held that the Board's decision to amend <br />the zoning regulations did not constitute a compensable taking under the <br />Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution because interests in de- <br />veloping wind farms were not vested rights, necessary to support a tak- <br />ings claim. The court also held that, although the zoning amendment was <br />not facially discriminatory, remand was required for determination as to <br />whether the amendment violated the dormant Commerce Clause. <br />The court explained that to prevail on a takings claim, the Landowners <br />would have to first establish that the "property" in question (i.e., the inter- <br />est in developing wind far-ms was one in which a vested interest existed. <br />The Board had argued that whatever interests the Landowners purport- <br />edly possessed before the moratorium, those interests were conditioned <br />upon the Board's discretionary issuance of a CUP. Accordingly, argued the <br />Board, interests such as developing, constructing, or operating CWECSs <br />were not vested rights. The court agreed, reiterating that an applicant <br />would have no vested rights in a CUP when its issuance depended upon <br />the discretionary approval of the Board. The court noted that in this case, <br />at all material times, the county zoning regulations granted absolute dis- <br />cretion to the Board for issuing CUPS. Accordingly, the court concluded <br />that no vested property right of any type had been taken from the Land- <br />owners by the Board. <br />As to the dormant Commerce Clause claim, the court explained that <br />it asks two questions to determine if a zoning regulation violates the dor- <br />mant Commerce Clause. First, it asks whether the challenged law discrimi- <br />nates (i.e., treats in -state and out -of -state economic interests differently by <br />benefiting the former and burdening the latter) on its face against inter- <br />state commerce. If so, it is invalid unless it "advances a legitimate local <br />purpose that cannot be adequately served by reasonable nondiscriminatory <br />alternatives." If not, then the court engages in a balancing test (known as <br />the Pike test) to determine if the burden imposed on interstate commerce is <br />"clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits." <br />Here, the court found that there was no facial discrimination as there <br />was no "differential treatment of in -state and out -of -state economic inter- <br />ests that benefited the former and burdened the latter." The court found <br />that the county's amended zoning regulations prohibited all CWECSs in <br />the county, regardless of whether the producer wished to sell the wind - <br />generated electricity in other states, in other Kansas counties, or within <br />Wabaunsee County itself. <br />The court said that absent discrimination, the balancing test need be <br />applied next to see whether the burden imposed on interstate commerce <br />would be clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits (if so <br />the amendments would be invalid; if not they would be upheld). court <br />remanded the matter to the district court to conduct this balancing test. <br />See also: Kansas Racing Management, Inc. v. Kansas Racing Com'n, 244 <br />Kan. 343, 770 P.2d 423 (1989). <br />6 © 2011 Thomson Reuters <br />