Agenda - Planning Commission - 02/02/2012

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December 10, 2011 1 Volume 51 No. 23 Zoning Bulletin or informal, whether personally or through an attorney in the municipal proceedings by, for example, `voic [ing] ... concerns for traffic, noise and aesthetics,' or `express[ing] opposition' at a municipal hearing." "Particu- larized injury" occurs when a judgment or order adversely and directly af- fects a party's property, pecuniary, or personal rights. When the appealing party is an abutting landowner, it need only assert a "reasonable allegation of a potential for particularized injury .... " The court found that the Partnership "appeared" before the Board through its attorney, even though its attorney failed to specify that he was representing the Partnership. The court found that it could be "inferred that [the attorney] appeared on behalf" of the Partnership. Thus, as to the Partnership's appeal of the BOA's decision to issue the permit in response to North South's appeal, the court held that the Partnership had stand- ing because: it both appeared (through its attorney) before the BOA and would suffer a particularized injury by the BOA's decision. As to the Partnership's appeal of the Planning Board's denial of North South's permit application, the court found that the Pai tiership did have a particularized injury despite the fact that the permit was denied. The court acknowledged that a party is usually not aggrieved by a judgment granting the relief requested in his pleadings (such as here, where the Part- nership was appealing a decision to deny North South grant of the per- mit—which is the relief the Partnership was seeking). However, the court said that an exception to that general rule is: when "an essential finding on which the judgment is based might otherwise prejudice the party through the use of collateral estoppel in the future proceeding." Here, the court found, "continuing adverse collateral consequences to the Partnership would result from its failure to challenge the basis of the Planning Board's denial of North South's permit." This was because "[a]lthough the Plan- ning Board did initially deny North South's application, had North South's subsequent appeal to the [BOA] been successful and had the Planning Board been ordered to issue the requested permit [—which is what conse- quently happened —b collateral estoppel would have barred the Partner- ship from challenging the bases on which the permit was granted." Thus, North South's pending and ultimately successful appeal created a con- tinuing opportunity for injury to the Partnership, which is all that was nec- essary to confer standing on the Partnership. See also: Sahl v. Town of York, 2000 MBE 180, 760 A.2d 266 (Me. 2000). See also: Friends of Lincoln Lakes v. Town of Lincoln, 2010 ME 78, 2 A.3 d 284 (Me. 2010). See also: Norris Family Associates, LLC v. Town of Phippsburg, 2005 ME 102, 879 A.2d 1007 (Me. 2005). See also: Great Cove Boat Club v. Bureau of Public Lands, 672 A.2d 91 (Me. 1996). 8 © 2011 Thomson Reuters