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William K. Goodrich <br />Page 6 <br /> <br />RECEIVEP <br />DEC 2 7 1 <br />Ans'd ............ <br /> <br />which was the subject of a referendum petition. The Court <br /> <br />assumed that the referendum petition was sufficient in suspending <br /> <br />the earlier ordinance, and stated in dicta: <br /> <br />We think it is correct that the council could <br />not then give life to the dead ordinance by <br />passing it over again, or by passing an <br />ordinance in all essential features like the <br />one against which the petition protested. <br />This would plainly be to nullify the <br />referendum provisions of the chapter. But it <br />is equally clear that the council is not <br />prevented from legislating on the subject <br />matter of the dead ordinance. It doubtless <br />may, if it acts in good faith and with no <br />intent to evade the effect of the referendum <br />petition, pass an ordinance covering the same <br />subject matter that is essentially different <br />from the ordinance protested against, <br />avoiding, perhaps, the objections made to the <br />first ordinance. <br /> <br />Id. The Court eventually found the second ordinance different in <br /> <br />substantial ways from the first ordinance. Id. at 100, 157 N.W. <br /> <br />at 992-93. <br /> <br />More recently, in Anderson v. City of Duluth, 279 Minn. 50, <br /> <br />55-57, 155 N.W.2d 281, 284-86 (1967), the Supreme Court held that <br /> <br />the City of Duluth had acted in good faith when it reenacted a <br /> <br />housing code ordinance which had been challenged by a technically <br /> <br />insufficient referendum petition. The Court agreed with the <br /> <br />trial court's finding that the citY reenacted the ordinance in <br /> <br />good faith only to give those who had objections to it enough <br /> <br />time to obtain a sufficient referendum petition, and therefore <br /> <br /> <br />