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February 10, 2012 I Volume 61 No. 3 Zoning Bulletin <br />The United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, held that: the <br />Church's RLUIPA claim was unripe because the church failed to complete <br />even one full use permit application. The court also held that the County <br />could not be equitably estopped from prohibiting the Church from using <br />its recreation hall for religious services without a required permit. <br />The court explained that the County's RLUIPA claim was unripe for <br />lack of a final decision. "A claim that the application of government reg- <br />ulations effects a taking of a property interest is not ripe until the gov- <br />ernment entity charged with implementing the regulations has reached <br />a final decision regarding the application of the regulations to the prop- <br />erty at issue," said the court. Here, since neither the Park owner nor the <br />Church submitted even a single application for a Use Permit, the court <br />"[could] . not determine if the Church ha[d] suffered a `substantial bur- <br />den' under RLUIPA ... ." The Church had presented no evidence that the <br />County would not or could not issue a Use Permit once the County had <br />received a complete application from the Church. <br />The Church had also argued that the County should be equitably es- <br />topped from prohibiting its use of the recreation hall for religious ser- <br />vices because, among other things: the Church did not know it needed <br />a permit to use the recreation hall for religious services; and the Church <br />had reasonably relied on the County's lack of enforcement of permit re- <br />quirements when it made certain improvements to the recreation hall. <br />The court rejected this equitable estoppel argument. The court explained <br />that in order for it to grant equitable estoppel, the Church had to es- <br />tablish four elements: (1) the County was "apprised of the facts "; (2) <br />the County intended that its conduct be acted upon, or acted such that <br />the Church "had a right to believe it was so intended "; (3) the Church <br />was "ignorant of the true state of the facts "; and (4) "relied upon [the] <br />conduct to [its] injury." If one of those elements was missing, the court <br />could not grant estoppel. Here, the court found that, among others, the <br />third element was missing. The Church "[could] not claim that it knew <br />neither that to use the recreation hall for religious services generally re- <br />quired a Use Permit, nor that the Church in particular needed to apply <br />for one." The Church had been informed by a County employee in 1986 <br />that a Use Permit was required. The Church could not, under California <br />law, "rely on lack of enforcement, even in the form of previous exemp- <br />tion grants, to establish entitlement to equitable estoppel." <br />See also: Williamson County Regional Planning Com'n v. Hamilton Bank <br />of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 105 S. Ct. 3108, 87 L. Ed. 2d 126 (1985). <br />See also: Green v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 185 Cal. App. 3d 544, 230 <br />Cal. Rptr. 13 (1st Dist. 1986). <br />See also: Golden Gate Water Ski Club v. County of Contra Costa, 165 <br />Cal. App. 4th 249, 80 Cal. Rptr. 3d 876 (1st Dist. 2008). <br />4 © 2012 Thomson Reuters <br />