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Zoning Bulletin August 25, 2012 I Volume 6 I Issue 16 <br />The City appealed. <br />DECISION: Judgment of trial court reversed, and matter remanded. <br />The Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 8, held that the Ordinance <br />did not violate equal protection (requiring parties similarly situated with re- <br />spect to a law to be treated alike under the law) by requiring eligible collec- <br />tives to have previously registered. <br />The Collectives had failed to make an "as -applied" equal protection chal- <br />lenge, so the court looked only at the constitutionality of the Ordinance on its <br />face. The court explained that where a statute makes distinctions involving <br />inherently suspect classifications or fundamental rights, it is subject to strict <br />scnitiny under the equal protection clause and may be upheld only if the <br />government establishes the distinction is necessary to achieve a compelling <br />state interest. However, in areas of social or economic policy not involving <br />suspect classifications or fundamental rights, a statute must be upheld against <br />an equal protection claim so long as there is any reasonably conceivable set of <br />facts that provides a rational basis for the classification. <br />Here, the court found the Ordinance did not make a distinction involving <br />either fundamental rights or suspect classification. At its base, held the court, <br />the Ordinance essentially provided a "grandfather provision" "with the added <br />gloss of a prior registration requirement." So-called "grandfather provisions," <br />noted the court, "have routinely withstood equal protection challenges." The <br />court concluded that the exclusion of a group of (unregistered) medical <br />marijuana dispensaries, while perhaps arguably "unfair," did not -violate equal <br />protection under the rational basis test. <br />The court also held that the Ordinance did not violate state procedural due <br />process by requiring collectives that did not previously register to cease opera- <br />tion immediately without the benefit of a hearing. The court said that Califor- <br />nia due process protection requires the existence of some statutory benefit or <br />entitlement before it is triggered. Here, the court found no such benefit or <br />entitlement that was in any way affected by the Ordinance. The MMPA did <br />not create a right collectively to cultivate medical marijuana. The MMPA cre- <br />ated no right or benefit, other than the right of certain specified persons to be <br />free from prosecution for certain specified state offenses based upon certain <br />specified conduct. The court found that the Ordinance in no way affected the <br />availability of this limited immunity and thus did not abrogate any right or <br />benefit created by the MMPA. <br />Furthermore, noted the court, even if the MMPA could be construed to cre- <br />ate some type of benefit or right affected by the Ordinance, there was no depri- <br />vation without due process. The Ordinance was enforceable by the City only <br />if the City commenced formal legal proceedings misdemeanor criminal <br />prosecutions, nuisance actions, or civil suits —subject to all the procedural <br />protections that full adversarial hearings provide. <br />The trial court's order granting preliminary injunction was reversed. The <br />case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. <br />See also: City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 96 S. Ct. 2513, 49 L. <br />Ed. 2d 511 (1976). <br />See also: Martinet v. Department of Fish & Game, 203 Cal. App. 3d 791, <br />250 Cal. Rptr. 7 (4th Dist. 1988). <br />© 2012 Thomson Reuters <br />