Agenda - Planning Commission - 10/04/2012

Home

September 10, 2012 I Volume 6 I Issue 17 Zoning Bulletin The Supreme Court granted summary judgment in favor of the Village. Mead appealed. DECISION: Affirmed as modified. The Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department, New York, held that the Ordinance validly regulated use, not ownership, of Mead's property. The court noted that the Ordinance did not single out a particular property owner for favorable or unfavorable treatment. Rather, the court found that all property owners in the Central Business District were treated the same under the Ordinance; all property owners were prohibited from operating an FFFR. Indeed, Mead was not an FFFR, nor did it seek to operate an FFFR. Therefore, Mead's ownership status bore no relationship to its inability to use its property for an FFFR; rather, Mead's use of the property was what was being regulated. Thus, the court concluded that the Ordinance regulated the use, not the ownership, of the subject property. The court declared the Ordinance, including the prohibition of FF- FRs, was valid and enforceable. See also: Dexter v. Town Bd. of Town of Gates, 36 N.Y.2d 102, 365 N.Y.S.2d 506, 324 N.E.2d 870 (1975). See also: Village of Valatie v. Smith, 83 N.Y.2d 396, 610 N.Y.S.2d 941, 632 N.E.2d 1264 (1994). Case Note: Mead had further alleged that the Ordinance was invalid because it "exces- sively regulate[d] the details" of Mead's business operations. The court dis- agreed, but did not provide an explanation for its holding. Case Note: The court noted that Mead failed to preserve for the court's review any conten- tion that there was no rational basis for distinguishing between FFFRs and non-FFFRs that meet two or more of the criteria set forth in the Ordinance. Mead failed to advance that contention in support of its motion for summary judgment. 10 © 2012 Thomson Reuters