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Zoning Bulletin June 25, 2011 1 Volume 5 1 No. 12 <br />claimed that only one site was suitable for the tower and that the <br />tower needed to be 120 feet above ground level to be effective. The <br />Town's zoning ordinance limited cell phone towers to 10 feet above <br />the average tree canopy. In this case, the ordinance would have lim- <br />ited Industrial Communications tower to 71 feet above ground lev- <br />el. Industrial Communications applied for a variance to construct <br />the tower. <br />The Town's Zoning Board of Adjustment (the "Board") denied the <br />variance. The Board found that Industrial Communications "failed <br />to meet the criteria for a variance under New Hampshire law." <br />Industrial Communications and the two wireless providers <br />then filed a lawsuit in federal district court against the Town un- <br />der % 704(a) of the federal Telecommunications Act of 1996 (the <br />"Act"), 47 U.S.C.A. § 332(c)(7). Section 704(a) allows —in de- <br />fined circumstances —an aggrieved person or entity to bring a suit <br />to override state or local law in order to construct cell phone tow- <br />ers. Section 704(a) allows a court to override a local restriction if <br />the court finds that the local action or refusal to act violates one or <br />more of the Act's grounds for relief. Here, Industrial Communica- <br />tions claimed that the Town's denial of the variance would effective- <br />ly "prohibit[] the provision of personal wireless services in violation <br />of the Act." <br />The Town initially defended the case. David and Marilyn Slade <br />(the "Slades"), who owned property within 200 feet of the pro- <br />posed tower, intervened in the case. The Slades "stood silent as the <br />Town handled the defense." <br />Eventually, the Town and Industrial Communications negotiated <br />a settlement. They agreed to vacate the Board's variance denial and <br />to permit a 100-foot tower —without further meetings, hearings, or <br />decisions of the Board. <br />The federal court entered, as a judgment in the case, the consent <br />decree proposed by Industrial Communications. <br />The Slades then appealed. On appeal, Industrial Communica- <br />tions argued that the Slades were not entitled to make claims on <br />their own behalf under the Act and therefore did not have standing <br />(i.e., the legal right) to pursue the case. <br />DECISION: Vacated, and matter remanded. <br />The United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit, first agreed <br />with Industrial Communications that the Slades were not entitled to <br />© 2011 Thomson Reuters 3 <br />