Agenda - Planning Commission - 12/06/2012

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November 10, 2012 I Volume 6 1 Issue 21 Zoning Bulletin Over the next several years, the Church provided all of the information required by the SEQRA process. The Church eventually submitted a proposed FEIS. Although the universe of issues relevant to the SEQRA review was complete, the Town began to request new information and raise new issues for the Church to address. The Church provided the requested information and attempted to meet the Town's demands. During the summer of 2002, the Town stopped the review process altogether due to the Church's refusal to reimburse it for certain disputed fees the Town had incurred during the process. In June 2003, the Church brought a legal action against the Town. Among other things, it alleged violations of RLUIPA. It sought an order compelling the Town to complete SEQRA review and approve the project. RLUIPA bars states from imposing or implementing a "land use regula- tion" in a manner that imposes a substantial burden on a person or institution's religious exercise unless it is the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling state interest. (42 U.S.C.A. § 2000cc(a)(1).) A "land use regulation" is defined as "a zoning or landmarking law, or the application of such a law, that limits or restricts a claimant's use or development of land." (42 U.S.C.A. § 2000cc-5(5).) A substantial burden is one that "directly coerces the religious institution to change its behavior." To find a violation of RLUIPA, the burden must be more than a minimal impact on religious exercise, and there must be a close nexus be- tween the two. �`1\ The Town had contended that RLUIPA was entirely inapplicable because SEQRA was not a land use regulation within the meaning of RLUIPA. The district court entered judgment for the Church on all counts; it found that RLUIPA applied and that the Town had violated RLUPIA. The Town appealed. DECISION: Affirmed. The :United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, held that the ac- tions of the Town in conducting the statutory environmental review pro- cess violated RLUIPA. In so holding, the court agreed with the Town that SEQRA itself was not a zoning or landmarking law for purposes of RLUIPA. However, the court held that when a government uses a statutory environmental review process as the primary vehicle for making zoning decisions, those deci- sions constitute the application of a zoning law and are within the purview of RLUIPA. Thus, the Town's use of the SEQRA process did not automati- cally implicate RLUIPA. However, concluded the court, the Town's ac- tions in using the SEQRA review process as its vehicle for deteuniining the zoning issues related to the Church's land use proposal and its denial of the Church's proposal constituted an application of its zoning laws "suf- ficient to implicate RLUIPA for a number reasons": First, the SEQRA review process was triggered because the Church required three discretion- 4 © 2012 Thomson Reuters