Agenda - Planning Commission - 01/31/2013 - Special

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December 10, 2012 I Volume 6 I Issue 23 Zoning Bulletin Looking at the second factor, the court held that although the ordinances af- fected one of the Owners' expectations —that at some indefinite time in the future they could convert their properties to some other specific uses —the or- dinances did not affect the Owners' "primary expectation" —of operating a manufactured home park. Thus, the court concluded that this factor, too, failed to support a federal takings claim. As to the third factor —the character of government action— the court explained that the government generally cannot " `forc[e] some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole." The court agreed with the Owners that the character of the City's action here (in enacting the ordinances and establishing the MHP districts) slightly favored their takings claim: "The intent and effect of the or- dinances are to require only [the Owners] and the other affected owners of manufactured home parks to continue to provide the public benefit (manufac- tured home parks), when the benefit could be distributed more widely (for example, by providing relocation assistance to owners of manufactured homes or a larger MHP zone district)." Still, the court noted that the ordinances did not force the Owners to continue operating their properties as MHPs; the Owners could decide to: close their parks; convert their properties to other al- lowed uses; or sell the properties. The court found that the ordinances had no effect on those other possible uses. In conclusion, finding the first two factors weighed strongly against a tak- ings claim and the third factor weighed only slightly in favor of a takings claim, the court concluded that, on their face, the ordinances did not constitute a taking under the United States Constitution. The court also held that the Owners' state takings claim failed because the ordinances did not destroy or limit any fundamental property right. The Own- ers had argued that the ordinances destroyed "one of the sticks in the bundle representing a fundamental property right, by depriving the [Owners'] of the right to dispose of their property as they choose and effectively conferring control of that right on the tenants." The court disagreed. It found that while the ordinances restricted to some extent the Owners' ability to use their prop- erties, the ordinances did not at all limit the Owners' ability freely to dispose of the property or convert their properties to one of the many permitted uses under the ordinances. Moreover, the court found that the park residents had "no ability —now or in the future —to require the parks' owners to perform any act [or prohibit any change in use or sale of property]." And, after applying a three -prong test, the court held that the ordinances did not violate the Owners' substantive due process rights because: (1) the ordi- nances were aimed at achieving a legitimate public purpose of promoting "high density, single family" development and a "choice in land tenancy"; (2) the ordinances used means that were reasonably necessary to achieve that purpose since (3) the ordinances were not unduly oppressive in that "the amount of harm [was] small or nonexistent" given there was little to no decrease in property values and given the fact that the Owners' were still able to use their properties "as they have been used for decades." See also: Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 98 S. Ct. 2646, 57 L. Ed. 2d 631, 11 Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1801, 8 Envtl. L. Rep. 20528 (1978). 6 ©2012 Thomson Reuters