Agenda - Planning Commission - 04/04/2013

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March 10, 2013 1 Volume 7 1 Issue 5 Zoning Bulletin taxpayer, or officer, department, board, or bureau of the City aggrieved" by the decision or zoning action. (Md. Code Article 66B, § 2.09(a)(1)(ii).) The court further explained that a "person aggrieved" included: "one whose personal or property rights are adversely affected by the decision of the board. The decision must not only affect a matter in which the protes- tant has a specific interest or property right but his interest therein must be such that he is personally and specially affected in a way different from that suffered by the public generally." Generally, "[a]n adjoining, confronting or nearby property owner is deemed, prima facie, to be specially damaged and, therefore, a person aggrieved." However, "[a] person whose property is far removed from the subject property ordinarily will not be considered a person aggrieved . . , [unless] he meets the burden of alleging and proving . that his personal or property rights are specially and adversely affected." The standard for determining whether a party is aggrieved so as to have standing is "flexible in the sense that it is based on a fact - intensive, case -by -case analysis." Addressing the Opponents' arguments, the court held first that the cre- ation of a class of aggrieved persons is done on an individual scale and not based on delineations of city neighborhoods; unless prima facie aggrieved, the requirement that an individual prove special aggrievement has been well - established. The Opponents' argument that the entire neighborhood should be considered an aggrieved class depended, found the court, on subtracting individual special aggrievement from the analysis; it assumed that every member of the neighborhood was automatically specially aggrieved. The court declined to create such "a bright -line rule, under which each person in the entire neighborhood qualifies as a member of the specially aggrieved class in every PUD case." Instead, the court said it would, on a case -by -case basis, continue to examine the specific facts al- leged to show aggrievement and compare that injury to harm suffered by the general public. Thus, here, since the Opponents could not claim standing based on being residents of an "aggrieved" neighborhood, Ray and Coyne each had to show: (1) he was "[a]n adjoining, confronting or nearby property owner" who was prima facie aggrieved; or (2) his "personal or property rights were specially and adversely affected." Both Ray and Coyne conceded that they were not prima facie aggrieved as both resided approximately 0.4 miles, or 2,000 feet, from the PUD. Therefore, the court said that in order to establish special aggrievement through proximity, the Opponents had to show they resided close enough to the rezoning action to be considered "almost" prima facie aggrieved and then show some additional evidence of harm. While the court found there was no bright -line rule for who qualifies as "almost" prima facie aggrieved, the court found that standing is usually given to those who live 200 to 1,000 feet away from the subject property, while those living more than 1,000 feet from a rezoning site are generally denied standing. Since Ray and Coyne lived more than 2,000 feet from the PUD, the court concluded that they were not "almost" prima facie aggrieved. In so concluding, the 4 © 2013 Thomson Reuters