Agenda - Planning Commission - 04/04/2013

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March 10, 2013 I Volume 7 1 Issue 5 Zoning Bulletin content (exempting public art and holiday decorations from its restric- tions), the distinctions themselves were justified for reasons independent of content: "public art and holiday decorations enhance rather than harm aes- thetic appeal, and . . . seasonal holiday displays have a temporary, and therefore less significant, impact on traffic safety." The court concluded that the Sign Ordinance placed "reasonable time, place, and manner restric- tions only on the physical characteristics of messages — including those voicing political protest and exempt[ed] certain categories of signs from those restrictions solely on the basis of the Town's asserted and legitimate interests of traffic safety and aesthetics." In other words, the Town exempted the public art and holiday decorations from its restrictions simply because the Town determined such "signs" posed less traffic safety and aesthetic concerns, not because of any preference for content. Accordingly, the court held that the Sign Ordinance was content neutral. Having found the Sign Ordinance was content neutral, the court proceeded to examine its constitutionality under intermediate scrutiny. The court explained that the Sign Ordinance would be constitutional if it: was found to further a substantial government interest; was narrowly tailored to further that interest; and was found to leave open ample alternative chan- nels of communication. The court found that the Town's stated interests in promoting aesthetics and traffic safety were substantial. Next, the court found the Sign Ordinance was narrowly tailored and did not burden substantially more speech than was necessary to further those stated interests because: the Sign Ordinance's size, color, and positioning restrictions did "no more than eliminate the exact source of the evil it sought to remedy." Finally, the court found that the sign Ordinance " [left] open ample alternative channels of com- munication' by generally permitting residential signs subject to reasonable restrictions "; within the Sign Ordinance's reasonable restrictions, a sign could contain any message the speaker wished to convey. Having concluded that the Sign Ordinance survived intermediate scrutiny, the court held that the Sign Ordinance was constitutional and did not violate the First Amendment. See also: Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703; 120 S. Ct. 2480, 147 L. Ed. 2d 597 (2000). See also: Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 101 S. Ct. 2882, 69 L. Ed. 2d 800, 16 Env't. Rep. Cas. (RNA) 1057, 11 Envtl. L. Rep. 20600 (1981). See also: Wag More Dogs, Ltd. Liability Corp. v. Cozart, 680 F.3d 359 (4th Cir. 2012). See also: Covenant Media Of SC, LLC v. City Of North Charleston, 493 F.3d 421 (4th Cir. 2007). © 2013 Thomson Reuters