Agenda - Planning Commission - 05/02/2013

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April 10, 2013 1 Volume 7 1 Issue 7 Zoning Bulletin multilane, heavily trafficked, Route 1-295 corridor in "heavy industrial zones." The court found that argument "ignore[d]" the fact that billboards are "real and substantial hazards to traffic safety" and "by their nature, wherever located and however constructed, can be perceived as an es- thetic harm." Accordingly, the court found that "[t]he industrial nature of the highway d[id] not mitigate [the Township's] concerns about the aesthetics of the highway." In fact, found the court, "it may well suggest an even greater need to guard against the deterioration of the Township's character and evoke a greater concern for safety." The court concluded that "[t]he fact that the [O]rdinance advances that substantial interest in a manner that, although all inclusive, is nevertheless not overly inclusive given the impact of billboards on a community, is sufficient to allow [the Ordinance] to survive Interstate's challenge even though it has a very real impact on Interstate's commercial speech." The court also rejected Interstate's argument that the Township's goals of traffic safety and aesthetics could be achieved with a less restrictive ordinance that allowed billboards in certain areas under certain conditions. The court reasoned: "[i]f the [Township] has a sufficient basis for believ- ing that billboards are traffic hazards and are unattractive, then obviously the most direct and perhaps the only effective approach to solving the problems they create is to prohibit them." The court further held that, as to its restrictions on noncommercial speech, the Ordinance did not violate the First Amendment because it: served the substantial governmental interests of traffic safety and aesthet- ics; specifically provided that it was to be applied in a content -neutral manner; and left open ample alternative channels for communication of the information. Interstate had argued that, although various alternative means of com- munication may be available (e.g., on -premises signs; Internet advertis- ing; radio; newspapers; etc.), those means were not available to the specific target audience of the drivers traveling I-295 that would be reached by the proposed billboards. The court said that "maximizing . . . profit is not the animating concern of the First Amendment." That Inter- state could not reach the distinct audience of travelers on the particular section of I-295 that it desired to target did not mean that adequate alterna- tive means of communication did not exist. See also: Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Service Com- mission of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 100 S. Ct. 2343, 65 L. Ed. 2d 341, 6 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1497, 34 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 178 (1980). See also: Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 101 S. Ct. 2882, 69 L. Ed. 2d 800, 16 Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1057, 11 Envtl. L. Rep. 20600 (1981). See also: Virginia State Bd. ofPharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 96 S. Ct. 1817, 48 L. Ed. 2d 346, 1 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1930, 1976-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) % 60930 (1976). 4 © 2013 Thomson Reuters