Agenda - Planning Commission - 05/02/2013

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Zoning Bulletin, April 10, 2013 1 Volume 7 1 Issue 7 Safety Standards Act of 1974 (the "Manufactured Housing Act") (42 U.S.C.A. §§ 5401-5426). He also alleged that the 10-Year Rule violated his constitutional rights to equal protection and due process. Finding no material issues of fact in dispute, and deciding the matter on the law alone, the district court awarded summary judgment to Opal. Schanzenbach appealed. DECISION: Affirmed. The United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit, held that the 10- Year Rule was not preempted by the Manufactured Housing Act. The court also held that the 10-Year Rule was sufficiently rational to survive the equal protection and substantive due process challenge. In so holding, the court explained that pursuant to the United States Constitution's Supremacy Clause, and the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of that clause, states (including local governments) are precluded from regulating conduct in a field that Congress, acting within its proper authority, has determined must be regulated by its exclusive governance. Also, state (and local government) laws are preempted when they conflict with federal law. The court determined that the 10-Year Rule was not preempted by the Manufactured Housing Act and its related regulations (see 24 CFR §§ 3280.101-3280.816) because the Manufactured Housing Act and the related regulations governed only the construction and safety of manufac- tured homes, and the 10-Year Rule did not regulate "the construction or safety" of manufactured homes but was based on Opal's interests of aesthetics and property values of its neighborhoods. Schanzenbach had argued that the 10-Year Rule related to the "durabil ity" of manufactured homes and thus was encompassed by construction and safety. The court disagreed, finding the "durability of the home [was] irrelevant under the [10-Year Rule]" because: "[n]o matter how durable the home, its age may bar it from being moved into town"; and "a home less than 10 years old when moved into town [would be] entitled to remain no matter how `undurable' it may be." Schanzenbach had also argued that the 10-Year Rule violated the Equal Protection Clause because it distinguished between manufactured homes older than 10 years and those younger than 10 years without a rational basis for doing so. The court found this argument to be "meritless." Since Schanzenbach had not suggested that he belonged to a suspect class or that he was asserting a fundamental constitutional right, the 10-Year Rule was "presumed to be valid" as long as it was "rationally related" to a le- gitimate interest of Opal. The court found the 10-Year Rule was rationally related to Opal's interest of aesthetics: "In our view, the town council could have rationally believed that a manufactured home more than 10 years old that is being moved onto a lot in the community is likely to be less attractive than the homes in the vicinity of the lot." The court also rejected Schanzenbach's argument that Opal's 10-Year 10 ©2013 Thomson Reuters