Agenda - Council - 03/28/1989 - Laserfiche WebLink

Home

,rice ~ute ele- ~e a ~ are is- ~.xe~ ~ner ! the the ~pay- ~rior ~ied. city ie Ii- i the We ~ ac- ~ the it act ; was res it Any y pro- )cf ore ['s re- g the ~ot on denies er the ~tions. ~d two itional icense- BERGMANN v. CITY OF MELROSE Cite as 420 N.W.2d 663 (Mlnn.App. 1988) [7,8] Assuming a classification scheme exists, we must uphold the classification if, under the familiar "rational basis" test, the classification is rationally related to the achievement of a legitimate governmental purpose. See Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamerl/Co., 449 U.S. 456, 464, 101 S.Ct. 715, 723-24, 66 L.Ed.2d 659 (1981), reh'g denied, 450 U.S. 1027, 101 S.Ct. 1735, 68 L.Ed.2d 222 (1981). Additional principles ii,nit our review of the constitutionality of legislative classifications. First, statutes carry a presumption of constitutionality; it is not the judiciary's role to question the factual accuracy or political wisdom of the reasoning underlying the legislativ~ an.aly- sis. In re IIarhut, 385 N.W.2d 305, 311 (Minn.1986). Second, the person challeng- ing thc classification under the rational-ba- sis test must prove'unconstitutionality be- yond a reasonable douht. Id. Analyzing the equal protection issue in two parts, in accordance with I~ re Ilar- hut, this conrt must answer the following questions: (1) Does the city have a legit- imate governmental purpose in condition- ing the issuance of liquor licenses on Berg- mann's operation of a restaurant? (2) Was it reasonable for the city to believe that that condition would promote that purpose? See id. [9] We hold that a city may legitimately issue a liquor license to encourage the es- tablishment of a needed family restaurant. It is well-established that an exercise of the police power will be upheld when it has for its object the public welfare and when it is reasonably related to the attainment of that objective. State ex tel. Gopher Sales Co. v. City of Austin, 246 Minn. 514, 517, 75 N.W.2d 780, 783 (1956). The record confirms that the public welfare would be served by the establishment of a family restaurant in the City of Melrose. The city has been without a family restaurant since 1975, and the council expressly found that it needed one. Additionally, the city al- ready has four on-sale and off-sale liquor establishments, has never had a liquor- store-only operation, and specifically found that it does not need additional liquor-only establishments. Minn. 667 The city could have denied Bergmann liquor licenses altogether. See Polman, 249 N.W.2d at 467. However, it decided to grant the liquor licenses to induce the oper- ation of a restaurant. Providing a proper- ty owner with an incentive to use his or her property in a particular way that serves the public welfare is a legitimate exercise of the police power. [10] The city may also restrict non-res- taurant liquor establishments to its down- town area to allocate its limited police re- sources effectively. Locating liquor estab- lishments in particular areas for law en- forcement purposes is a legitimate exercise of a city's police powers. Cf Cleveland, 238 Minn. at 186, 56 N.W.2d at 645 (liquor regulation which establishes a classifica- tion on the basis of the difference in police supervision between rural and urban areas is founded on a reasonable basis). Under the second part of the Harhut test, it was clearly rational for the city to conclude that the condition might induce the operation of a family restaurant. Whether the condition induces Bergmann in fact to operate a restaurant is not the question. See Clover Leaf Creamery, 449 U.S. at 464, 101 S.Ct. at 723-24. Berg- mann may ultimately decide that financial constraints would make the operation of a liquor store/restaurant combination impos- sible. Nevertheless, the equal protection clause is still satisfied, because the city co,rid have rationally decided that the condition might induce Bergmann to oper- ate a restaurant. See id. [ll] It was also rational for the city council to conclude that locating all liquor- only establishments in the downtown area would facilitate law enforcement and liquor control. An establishment that serves only liquor is qualitatively different from a res- taurant that serves liquor only as an ad- junct to food. Cf. Anton's, Inc. v. City of Minneapolis, 375 N.W.2d 504, 507 (Minn. Ct. App.1985) (liquor establishment with live music and dancing is qualitatively different from restaurant serving liquor). The city could reasonably have concluded that an .additional liquor-only establishment, locat- ed away from the downtown area where