Agenda - Planning Commission - 07/18/2013 - Special

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May 25, 2013 I Volume 7 I Issue 10 Zoning Bulletin the Town's zoning regulations because it extended beyond the permit- ted setback. The Tines sought a variance for the deck. The Board denied the vari- ance request. In January 2009, the ZEO issued a cease and desist order to the Tines. The order required the Tines to abate the setback violation, pre- sumably by removing the deck. The Tines appealed to the Board. They argued that the ZEO was barred from pursuing the enforcement action against them because the violation had existed for more than three years at the time the cease and desist order was issued. Therefore, they contended, the statute of limi- tations set forth in Conn. Gen. Stat. § 8-13a(a) had run. Section 8-13a(a) provides in relevant part: "When a building is so situated on a lot that it violates a zoning regulation of a municipality which prescribes the location of such a building in relation to the boundaries of the lot . . . and when such building has been so situated for three years without the institution of an action to enforce such regulation, such building shall be deemed a nonconforming building in relation to such boundaries . . .." The Tines contended that the deck was a "nonconforming building" under the statute and that, therefore, the three-year statute of limita- tions applied and the notice of violation and cease and desist order was invalid. The superior court agreed. The Board and ZEO sought a certification to appeal to the Appellate Court. The Supreme Court transferred the appeal. DECISION: Reversed, and matter remanded. The Supreme Court of Connecticut held that the deck was not a "building" under the Conn. Gen. Stat. § 8-13a(a) and that, therefore, the three-year statute of limitations did not apply and the notice of violation and cease and desist order was valid. In so holding, the court interpreted § 8-13a(a). Finding § 8-13a(a) did not define "building," the court looked to the definition of "build- ing" in dictionaries. Generally, the court found that "building" was defined as a structure with walls and a roof. The court also found far- ther support for a differentiation between a "building" and a "structure" in the fact that Connecticut statutes were "replete with provisions that distinguish between `buildings' and `structures.' " Accordingly, because § 8-13a (a) applies only to "buildings" and not all "structures," defining "building" to include all "structures" would produce "absurd and unworkable results," determined the court. The court therefore concluded that the plain meaning of the term "building" as it is used in § 8-13a (a) refers to "an edifice designed to 10 ©2013 Thomson Reuters