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Zoning Bulletin July 25, 2013 I Volume 7 I Issue 14 <br />"[A] regulation may effect a taking requiring just compensation even <br />if it does not deprive the owner of 'all economically beneficial use' of <br />his or her property, depending on the particular circumstances of the <br />case . . . . Furthermore, a temporary regulatory taking may require <br />payment of just compensation for the period the taking was in effect." <br />Thus, "while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation <br />goes too far it will be recognized as a taking." A government regulation, <br />such as in this case, which neither causes a property owner to "suffer a <br />permanent physical invasion" of his or her property nor deprives the <br />owner of "all economically beneficial use" of the property, may still <br />amount to a regulatory taking dependent upon the weighing of three pri- <br />mary factors: (1) the "economic impact" of the regulation on the claim- <br />ant; (2) the extent to which the regulation interferes with "distinct <br />investment -backed expectations"; and (3) the "character of the govern- <br />mental action." <br />Here, the court concluded that the County's actions amounted to a <br />regulatory taking because: (1) the County's regulatory action "unreason- <br />ably impaired both the value and use" of the Lockaway Property — <br />particularly in light of the fact that Lockaway always intended to develop <br />the Property as a storage facility, had invested substantially in that <br />development with no indication from the County administrators that it <br />could not under Measure D, and would have incurred substantial costs to <br />convert the property to another use; (2) the County's regulatory action <br />interfered with Lockaway's reasonable investment backed expectation <br />that its Project could proceed, given that the County had confirmed that <br />Lockaway could rely on the CUP and encouraged the development, until <br />the County changed its position in September 2002; and (3) the County's <br />"regulatory about face was manifestly unreasonable," not just because <br />of its "devastating" economic impact on Lockaway, but also because it <br />deprived Lockaway of a "meaningful opportunity to attempt to protect <br />its property rights" given that the change of position came at the expira- <br />tion.of the CUP. <br />The court concluded that the County's application of Measure D to <br />shut down the Lockaway Project was a temporary regulatory taking that <br />required the payment of just compensation. The court affirmed the dam- <br />ages and attorney's fees award. <br />See also: Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, <br />98 S. Ct. 2646, 57 L. Ed. 2d 631, 11 Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1801, 8 <br />Envtl. L. Rep. 20528 (1978). <br />See also: Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 121 S. Ct. 2448, <br />150 L. Ed. 2d 592, 52 Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1609, 32 Envtl. L. Rep. <br />20516 (2001). <br />©2013 Thomson Reuters 11 <br />