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August 10, 2013 I Volume 7 I Issue 15 Zoning Bulletin <br />114 S. Ct. 2309, 129 L. Ed. 2d 304, 38 Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1769, 24 <br />Envtl. L. Rep. 21083 (1994). Those cases held that "the government may <br />not condition the approval of a land -use peiiiiit on the owner's relinquish- <br />ment of a portion of his property unless there is a nexus and rough <br />proportionality between the government's demand and the effects of the <br />proposed land use." <br />The District Court of Appeal affirmed. However, the State Supreme <br />Court reversed on two grounds. It held that the District's demand for <br />property from Koontz did not have to meet the Nollan and Dolan require- <br />ments and have a nexus and rough proportionality to the effects of the <br />proposed land use since: (1) the District denied the permit (unless Koontz <br />met the conditions); and (2) the District's demand was for money (to hire <br />contractors to improve offsite wetlands on public lands). <br />Koontz appealed. Recognizing that the majority opinion of the Florida <br />Supreme Court rested on a question of federal constitutional law on which <br />the lower courts were divided, the Supreme Court of the United States <br />granted the petition for a writ of certiorari. <br />DECISION: Reversed, and matter remanded. <br />The Supreme Court of the United States held that the government's <br />demand for property from a land -use permit applicant must satisfy the <br />Nollan and Dolan requirements and thus have a nexus and rough <br />proportionality to the effects of the proposed land use even when: (1) the <br />government denies the permit; and (2) the government's demand is for <br />money. <br />The court explained: The " `unconstitutional conditions doctrine' <br />vindicates the Constitution's enumerated rights by preventing the govern- <br />ment from coercing people into giving them up." In the land use context, <br />the unconstitutional conditions doctrine protects the Fifth Amendment <br />right to just compensation for property the government takes when own- <br />ers apply for land -use permits. Pursuant to Nollan and Dolan, a govern- <br />ment's demand for property from a land -use permit applicant is constitu- <br />tional as long as it has a "nexus and rough proportionality to the effects of <br />the land use." In other words, the government can condition approval of a <br />permit on the dedication of property to the public so long as there is a <br />"nexus" and "rough proportionality" between the property that the <br />government demands and the social costs of the applicant's proposal. <br />Those requirements accommodate two "realities of the permitting pro- <br />cess," explained the court: (1) "the broad discretion of a government to <br />deny a permit that is worth far more than property it would like to take"; <br />and (2) the fact that "many proposed land uses threaten to impose costs on <br />the public that dedications of property can offset." Thus, under Nollan and <br />Dolan, "the government may choose whether and how a permit applicant <br />is required to mitigate the impacts of a proposed development, but it may <br />not leverage its legitimate interest in mitigation to pursue governmental <br />ends that lack an essential nexus and rough proportionality to those <br />impacts." Accordingly, in this case, any conditions that the District placed <br />4 © 2013 Thomson Reuters <br />