Agenda - Planning Commission - 09/05/2013

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Zoning Bulletin August 10, 2013 I Volume 7 I Issue 15 a "decisive role" for the City Council which required the "exercise of legislative discretion" in determining whether the City would enter into development agreements after all other preliminary prerequisites were met. Northeast had contended that the action of the City Council in tabling the vote on the Phase III Development Agreement was "targeted at North- east" and was "therefore too narrowly focused to constitute legislative activity." The court disagreed. It noted that the reasons cited for tabling the Phase III Development Agreement were: that certain items on a punch list provided to Northeast were not addressed; and the opinion of at least one councilwoman was that support of the project in the KOZ amounted to some form of "corporate welfare" that mired the City in debt. The court found the City Council's decision to table the Phase III Development Agreement was a legislative action because it affected "far more than just [Northeast]." The court found that it affected the "entire community" in that: the policy considerations related to KOZ developments affected the entire community with regard to taxes, standards of living, and business development; and the Development Agreement implicated the property rights of individual neighbors surrounding the Phase III project. More- over, said the court, even if the decision to table approval of the Develop- ment Agreement was "engendered by concern over [Northeast's] activi- ties" and directed at Northeast alone, "the City Council's decision affected the entire community." The court concluded that Northeast was not deprived of procedural due process because the City Council's actions were legislative in nature. See also: Rogin v. Bensalem Tp., 616 F.2d 680 (3d Cir. 1980). See also: L C & S, Inc. v. Warren County Area Plan Com'n, 244 F.3d 601 (7th Cir. 2001). Notice —Board fails to provide notice of date of mailing when issuing zoning decision Applicant contends his appeal period therefore commenced on date he received decision Citation: Schmader v. Cranberry Tp. Bd. of Sup'rs, 67 A.3d 881 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2013) PENNSYLVANIA (06/07/13)—This case addressed the issue of whether a recent amendment to § 1002-A(a) of the Pennsylvania Munici- palities Planning Code ("MPC")—which provided that a 30-day appeal period for zoning decisions applied to all cases unless an unconstitutional deprivation of due process would result —effectively relieved an agency © 2013 Thomson Reuters 9