Agenda - Planning Commission - 01/09/2014

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November 25, 2013 I Volume 7 I Issue 22 Zoning Bulletin The Cockerhams appealed the ZEO's issuance of the zoning permit. They argued that the ZEO misinterpreted the applicable zoning regula- tion and that the permit should not have issued. The Cockerhams argued that the proper interpretation of "separately owned" in the zon- ing regulations providing for nonconforming lots, which could be used for single-family residences, were lots that were owned by separate people. The Cockerhams pointed to the fact that 6 Glen Road and 4 Glen Road were owned by the same people the Donahues—prior to the enactment of the zoning regulations in 1966. Accordingly, they argued that the lot at 4 Glen Road did not meet the zoning regulations definition of "separately owned" nonconforming lot on which single- family residences could be built, and that the ZEO wrongfully issued a zoning permit to Bialowans. The Zoning Board of Appeals (the "Board") disagreed. It agreed with the ZEO 's interpretation of "separately owned" nonconforming lots as meaning lots that had separate legal descriptions and had been conveyed by separate deeds. The Cockerhams again appealed. The superior court dismissed the appeal. Although it found that the term "owned separately" reasonably could have two meanings, it found persuasive and deferred to the inter- pretation of the regulations upheld by the Board. The Cockerhams again appealed. DECISION: Judgment of superior court affirmed. The Appellate Court of Connecticut agreed with the ZEO/Board's interpretation of the term "separately owned." It held that term "separately owned," in the Town's zoning regulations providing that nonconforming lots, which could be used for single-family residences, were lots that were separately owned prior to enactment of Town's zoning regulations, meant: lots that had separate legal descriptions and had been conveyed by separate deeds. In so holding, the court noted that when faced with two equally plausible interpretations of regulatory language, the court must give deference to the construction of that language adopted by the agency charged with enforcement of the regulations (i.e., here the ZEO). More- over, the court found that interpretation was supported by substantial evidence, including evidence that it had been the custom of the Town's ZEO to construe the "separately owned" language to mean separately described by deed. The court found it irrelevant that nearby towns interpreted similar language in their zoning regulations to mean owned by separate people. See also: Bank of America v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Borough of Fenwick, 46 Conn. L. Rptr. 430, 2008 WL 4378824 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2008). 8 © 2013 Thomson Reuters