Agenda - Planning Commission - 04/03/2014

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February 25, 2014 I Volume 8 I Issue 4 Zoning Bulletin The County countered that the ZA's compliance letter was simply a "courtesy"; it was not in the nature of a legislative act, and did not constitute an unambiguous approval of McQueen's proposed development. Thus, the County contended, the letter did not constitute a significant affirmative governmental act, thereby negating McQueen's vesting claim. The circuit court ruled in favor of McQueen, finding that he established each of the three elements required under County Code for his "land use rights [to develop his property as a cluster subdivision]" to vest. The County appealed. DECISION: Judgment of circuit court reversed. The Supreme Court of Virginia held that the ZA's compliance letter did not constitute a "significant affirmative governmental act" as required under the County Zoning Code for a land use right to become vested. The Court explained that since the compliance letter did not fall within one of the seven enumerated acts in the County Code, it would only be considered a "significant affirmative governmental act" (required for vested rights under the Code) if "the evidence to support the claim to [the vested land use] rights [was] clear, express, and unambiguous." The court further said that "[e]vidence of 'only a future expectation' that [McQueen] [would] be allowed to develop his property in accordance with [zoning regulations]" would be "insufficient to establish a vested property right in the continua- tion of the property's existing status." Here, the court found that the ZA's "compliance letter" did not af- firmatively approve McQueen's proposed development of a cluster subdivi- sion, nor did it make any commitment to McQueen regarding the proposed project, found the court. Rather, the court found that the compliance letter merely confiu ned that McQueen's proposed development met the general standards for a cluster subdivision. Because McQueen's proposal complied with those standards, the ZA's compliance letter had advised McQueen that he was entitled to pursue his project as a matter of right (i.e., without discretionary approval by the County). The court emphasized"that was far short of the "clear, express, and unambiguous" approval of, or commitment to, a specific plan of development by McQueen as required for tha creation of a vested development right. Having concluded that the ZA's coinp-liance letter was not a significant affirmative governmental act required for vested rights to accrue, the court held that McQueen did not acquire vested rights under the County Zoning Code. See also: Board of Sup'rs of Stafford County v. Crucible, Inc., 278 Va. 152, 677 S.E.2d 283 (2009). 4 2014 Thomson Reuters