Agenda - Planning Commission - 04/03/2014

Home

February 25, 2014 I Volume 8 I Issue 4 Zoning Bulletin actions in establishing the moratorium on subdivision applications and for declining to receive any applications until it had adopted procedural and substantive subdivision regulations. DECISION: Judgment of circuit court affirmed in relevant part. The Supreme Court of Alabama held that the jury's decision in the case, which found the Town negligent in failing to consider Lee's application, was "not plainly wrong or manifestly unjust." The court explained that, as- suming, for the sake of argument, that the planning commission had the authority to institute a moratoria on subdivision -plat applications, the plan- ning commission could not, however, exercise its authority to regulate subdivisions in a way that contravened other laws. The court cited Alabama Code § 11-52-32(a), which requires municipal planning commissions to ap- prove or disapprove a plat within 30 days, with failure to do so deeming the plat approved. Also, the court stated the Town could not exceed the scope of its § 11-52-32 powers by extending its ability to place restrictions on Lee's private property. The court acknowledged the Town's need to adopt rules and policies for its transaction of business. However, the court also noted that the Town had decided to take on the responsibility of considering Lee's plat application before the planning commission ever adopted such rules. The court found that the jury "could have reasoned that the [Town, nevertheless] . . . imposed its own jurisdiction to prevent the approval of [Lee's] plat application." The Town had contended that even if found negligent, it was entitled to municipal immunity. In Alabama, "neither counties nor municipalities . . . are part of the State or enjoy State immunity " As such, the Town was not entitled to State immunity under the Alabama Constitution (Art. I, § 14, Ala. Const.1901). Alabama Code § 11-47-190 entitles municipalities to immunity under certain circumstances, but provides there is no immunity from liability based on the conduct of agents, officer, or employees of the municipality. The Town had argued that its case fell under a narrow exception to the general rule that a municipality is not immune from liability for negligence. It maintained that it was immune from liability where, as here, its responsi- bility to provide for the public safety, health, or general welfare''outweighed the reasons for imposing liability on it. The court rejected that argument' It•.found that the Town "seemingly lacked a public -interest reason for delaying the consideration of Lee's plat application and for thereby thwarting the development of her private property." Further, it noted that the public -policy exception applied only in "rare instances" such as when "those narrow areas of governmental activi- ties [are] essential to the well-being of the governed," or when "the imposi- tion of liability can be reasonably calculated to materially thwart the City's legitimate efforts to provide such public services." The court concluded that municipal immunity could not extend to protect a municipality for the actions of its agents who sought extraterritorial juris- 6 © 2014 Thomson Reuters