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Agenda - Planning Commission - 04/03/2014
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Agenda - Planning Commission - 04/03/2014
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Planning Commission
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04/03/2014
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Zoning Bulletin <br />March 10, 2014 I Volume 8 I Issue 5 <br />The Background/Facts: Four nonprofit citizen groups (the "Objectors") in <br />the City of Charleston (the "City"), whose missions included protecting qual- <br />ity of life for City citizens and/or the historic and, cultural character of the <br />City, brought a legal action seeking an injunction against Carnival Corpora- <br />tion ("Carnival"). The Objectors alleged unlawful use of the Union Pier <br />Terminal (the "Terminal") in the City by Carnival's cruise ship, the Fantasy. <br />Among other things, the Objectors brought zoning and nuisance claims. <br />They alleged that the Fantasy's use of the Terminal violated City zoning codes <br />because: it was not a permissible use within the light industrial zone applicable <br />to the Terminal; it was an accommodations use in an area not zoned for ac- <br />commodations uses; it was a tour boat use in an area not within a tour boat <br />overlay zone; the Fantasy exceeded the applicable height ordinance; and the <br />Fantasy ship blocked views of the Cooper River in violation of the applicable <br />view corridor provisions. The Objectors also alleged that Carnival violated the <br />City's sign ordinance because the Fantasy's smokestack was a sign, and <br />violated the City's noise ordinance because the Fantasy made announcements <br />over amplified sound systems. <br />The South Carolina State Ports Authority (the "Port Authority"), which <br />owned and operated the Terminal, and the City were permitted to intervene as <br />defendants in the case. Carnival, the Port Authority and the City (collectively, <br />the "Defendants") moved to dismiss the case on the grounds that the Objectors <br />lacked standing (i.e., the legal right to bring the action). The Defendants also <br />petitioned the Supreme Court of South Carolina to take the case, which was <br />granted. <br />DECISION: Action dismissed. <br />The Supreme Court of South Carolina held that the Objectors lacked stand- <br />ing to bring any of the claims contained in their complaint. <br />In so holding, the court explained that to possess standing, the Objectors <br />had to satisfy three elements: (1) they had to have suffered an injury -in -fact <br />which was a concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent invasion of a <br />legally protected interest; (2) there had to be a causal connection between the <br />injury and the challenged conduct (i.e., Fantasy's alleged improper use of the <br />Terminal); and (3) it had to be likely that a favorable decision Would redress <br />the injury. <br />Here, the court found that the first element was missing: The=Objectors <br />failed to allege a concrete, particularized harm to a legally protected interest <br />and therefore lacked standing. The court' explained that in order for an injury <br />to be particularized, it must affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual <br />way. Here, the court found that the harms alleged —which included traffic <br />congestion, noise pollution, air pollution, and the disruption of the historic <br />skyline —were insufficient for standing as they were only general grievances, <br />claiming harm to the public and seeking relief that no more directly and <br />tangibly benefited the Objectors than it did the public at large. <br />The court also acknowledged that the Objectors, as associations, could pos- <br />sess standing by virtue of associational standing on behalf of their members. <br />The court explained that an organization has associational standing "if one or <br />more of its members [would] suffer an individual injury by virtue of the <br />©2014 Thomson Reuters 5 <br />
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