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March 10, 2014 1 Volume 8 1 Issue 5 <br />Zoning Bulletin <br />After a trade group representing the developers questioned the County's <br />practice of accepting the proffers in advance of the time specified in the stat- <br />ute, the County filed a complaint for declaratory judgment in court, naming <br />the developers and Williamsburg as respondents. The County contended that <br />Code § 15.2-2303.1:1(A) had no application to proffers agreed to prior to the <br />statute's effective date of July 1, 2010. The County asked the court to declare <br />that the statute "applied prospectively and has no retroactive effect." <br />Williamsburg and the Developers all answered the complaint, contesting <br />the County's position. They asked the circuit court to declare that § 15.2- <br />2303.1:1 was to be applied retroactively. <br />The circuit court concluded that. Code § 15.2-2303.1:1 was to be applied <br />"to any and all cash payments owed pursuant to any and all cash proffers <br />requested, offered, or accepted for residential construction on a per -dwelling <br />unit or per -home basis, notwithstanding whether such proffered payments <br />were agreed to prior to or after the effective date of that statute." The court <br />concluded that the County had violated § 15.2-2303.1:1 by collecting the cash <br />proffers at issue prior to final inspection. <br />Accordingly, finding there were no material issues of fact in dispute, and <br />deciding the matter on the law alone, the court issued summary judgment in <br />favor of the Developers and Williamsburg, and granted judgment for the <br />developers on their counterclaim. <br />The County appealed. <br />DECISION: Judgment of circuit court affirmed in part, reversed in <br />part, and matter remanded. <br />The Supreme Court of Virginia held that § 15.2-2303.1:1 applied <br />retroactively. In so holding, the court acknowledged that retroactive laws are <br />not favored and that a statute is always construed to operate prospectively un- <br />less a contrary legislative intent is evident. Here, the court found such contrary <br />intent in the language of the statute. <br />Looking at the language of the statute, the court found it clear that in the <br />overall context of the statute the legislature intended to limit the time for pay- <br />ment of cash proffers to the period following a final inspection and before the <br />issuance of a certificate of occupancy "[n]otwithstanding the provisions of any <br />cash proffer requested, offered, or accepted." (Emphasis added by the court.) <br />The court found that the plain meaning of that language clearly indioted that <br />even if an existing cash proffer already agreed to, but not yet due on the effec- <br />tive date of the statute, required a paymsrrt.to a locality before the completion <br />of a final inspection, the new statute would`'apply, "[n]otwithstanding" that <br />requirement, to delay the authority of the locality to demand or accept pay- <br />ment until after the final inspection of a subject unit is completed. <br />Accordingly, the court concluded that "payments of cash proffers owed to a <br />locality under rezoning agreements adopted prior to July 1, 2010 were none- <br />theless subject to Code § 15.2-2303.1:1(A) for the purpose of determining <br />when the locality's right to receive or accept the payment would accrue." <br />The court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court granting summary judg- <br />ment to the Developers and Williamsburg Landing on the County's complaint <br />for declaratory judgment. <br />10 ©2014 Thomson Reuters <br />