Agenda - Planning Commission - 04/03/2014

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Zoning Bulletin March 25, 2014 I Volume 8 ( Issue 6 petition was filed pursuant to § 6.02 of the City's charter. Although not specifically addressing development orders, § 6.02 conferred upon the City's residents a general power of referendum with regard to the pas- sage of city ordinances. It provided_as follows: "The qualified voters of the city shall have the power by petition to require reconsideration by the council of any adopted ordinance or resolution, and . if council fails to repeal an ordinance or resolution, to approve or reject it at a city election .. . . At the time the Residents initiated their petition, § 163.3167(8), Flor- ida Statutes (2011) ("the 2011 Amendment"), barred referendum proceedings for all development orders. As became effective on April 6, 2012, however, the Legislature amended § 163.3167(8) (the "2012 Amendment") to permit local governments to "retain[ ] and implement[ ]" charter provisions that were in effect as of June 1, 2011, and provided "for an initiative or referendum process in regard to development orders" (§ 163.3167(8), Fla. Stat. (2012)). Unsure of the 2012 Amendment's impact, the City brought suit in the circuit court, asking the court to declare that development orders, such as Ordinance 5203, were not statutorily subject to referendum. One week later, Archstone intervened in the action as a coplaintiff. The City and Archstone argued that the City was powerless to process the Residents' referendum petition since the 2012 Amendment's "grandfather" clause applied only to a charters with an "express" referendum provision, and "the City ha[d] never had a referendum process that specifically applied to development orders." Finding there were no material issues of fact in dispute, and deciding the matter on the law alone, the trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the Residents. The court concluded that, through the passage of the 2012 Amendment, "the Legislature intended for the referendum pro- cess to be permitted for Development Orders, where . . . the City Charter provided for this prior to June, 2011." Accordingly, since § 6.02's gen- eral provision "for the referendum process on any Ordinance. impliedly included development orders, the trial court reasoned "the 2012 Amend- ment support[ed] the referendum process in th[e instant] case." The City and Archstone appealed. They argued that the trial court improperly interpreted the 2012 Amendment. They maintained that with the 2012 Amendment, the Legislature did riot change the previous bar on referendums for development orders, but only grandfathered in a municipality's charter provision that expressly provided for a referen- dum process in regard to development orders. DECISION: Judgment of circuit court reversed and matter remanded. The District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District, agreed with the City and Archstone. The court concluded that it was the Legislature's intent, under the 2012 Amendment, to bar referendum for development 2014 Thomson Reuters 9