Agenda - Planning Commission - 06/05/2014

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April 25, 2014 I Volume 8 I Issue 8 Zoning Bulletin right. The writ ordinarily does not lie where the action to be reviewed is discretionary or depends on personal judgment." Here, the court found that all of the mandamus counts of the complaint re- lated to duties on which County officials enjoyed discretion as to what, if any action to take. As to the County's role as regulator, the court found that while the County was charged generally with the responsibility to enforce land use and zoning requirements, it clearly did not pursue enforcement on every argu- able violation. The court noted that there were "a myriad of discretionary de- cisions made in determining how to employ limited resources," and that it was "well within the discretion of County officials to pick and choose among the categories of violations, or to prioritize certain types or areas of enforcement." The court also noted that the County may "legitimately decide not to pursue enforcement in matters where they believe, perhaps even wrongly, that they may not prevail." Thus, the court concluded that the enforcement arena was "simply littered with decisions that are discretionary." As to the County's role as landlord, the court noted that, "[1]ike any party to a contract, County officials charged with administration of a contract may properly consider a myriad of factors in determining whether the other party has breached the contract and, if so, what to do about it." The court concluded that this was not an appropriate circumstance for common law mandamus. As to the declaratory judgment claim, the appellate court rejected the circuit court's conclusion that declaratory judgment would not serve to terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the proceeding. The circuit court had focused on the fact that the only specific injunctive relief requested by the Community Association in that count of the complaint was for an order direct- ing Oregon —as opposed to the County to remove some of the paving from the parking lot. The appellate court said that declaratory judgment does not depend on the specificity of the party's request for ancillary relief to enforce the declaration. Rather, the court determined that the circuit court had the authority to issue a declaratory judgment as to whether the Board of Appeals orders were violated by the paving of the parking lot, as well as the authority to decide what, if any, ancillary injunctive relief to grant. See also: Goodwich v. Nolan, 343 Md. 130, 680 A.2d 1040 (1996). Case Note: The case also addressed the issue of whether the Community Association was required to pursue an administrative remedy prior to seeking either mandamus or declaratory relief The court noted that the decision as to the alleged violation of the Board ofAp- peals orders turned on whether the paving was otherwise required by law and the only "other law" proffered by the County or Oregon was the ADA—not a statute within the peculiar expertise of County zoning officials. Thus, resort to the courts did not interfere with an efficient administrative process on a matter within the expertise of the agency, found the court. In these circumstances, held the court, the Community Association was not required to initiate another proceeding under the county zoning regulations to seek enforcement of the final administrative orders issued as a result of the first two proceedings. 6 © 2014 Thomson Reuters