Agenda - Planning Commission - 06/05/2014

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April 25, 2014 I Volume 8 I Issue 8 Zoning Bulletin Powder Run appealed. DECISION: Judgment of district court affirmed. The Court of Appeals of Utah held that the 30-day statute of limitations applied. In so holding, the court rejected Powder Run's arguments that it did not apply. Powder Run had first argued that the statute, by its terms, did not apply to its case because Powder Run was not seeking "review" of the City's decision to accept the dedication. Rather, Powder Run argued that because Black Diamond did not have any legal right to dedicate the easement to the City, the district court should "conclude that in fact no dedication occurred," declare the dedication void ab initio, and quiet title to the easement in Powder Run. The court found that this argument ignored the fact that the City accepted the allegedly invalid dedication and passed an ordinance making a portion of the easement a public street. The court saw "no way to read Powder Run's com- plaint other than as a request for the district court to review the City's decision to accept the dedication of a portion of the easement as a public street." Powder Run had also argued that the statute did not apply to its suit because Powder Run was not "adversely affected" by the City's ordinance. Powder Run argued that because the dedication was invalid, it had no impact on Powder Run's property rights. The court disagreed, finding the City's decision to accept the dedication adversely affected Powder Run. Moreover, the court found that Powder Run's complaint belied its argument, as the complaint al- leged that the City claimed a right adverse to Powder Run. Powder Run had also maintained that the ordinance adopted by the City, which accepted the dedication of the easement, was void and that statutes of limitations did not apply to void ordinances. The court found that it "need not determine whether the rule governing void judgments applies to void ordi- nances in general" because it concluded that § 10-9a-801 (the statute of limi- tations here) contemplated a limitation on the type of suit brought by Powder Run in this case. Powder Run argued that the ordinance was void and of no ef- fect, which was a direct challenge to the validity of the ordinance. Section 10- 9a-801, said the court, governs challenges to the validity of a municipality's land use decisions, ordinances, and regulations. Powder Run had also argued that its quiet title action was a true quiet title action to which statutes of limitations do not apply. The court disagreed say- ing that "all actions in which the principal purpose is to obtain some affirma- tive relief . . . clearly come within the [statute of limitations]." Here, the court found that Powder Run's suit did not qualify as a true quiet title action, as the basis of Powder Run's claim was its argument that the ordinance was void. Thus, Powder Run could not succeed on its quiet title claim against Black Diamond unless the court first determined that the ordinance was invalid. Therefore, concluded the court, the statute of limitations governing challenges to city land use decisions applied to Powder Run's quiet title action. Finally, Powder Run had argued that the statute of limitations did not apply to Powder Run because it was a party in actual possession under a claim of ownership. The court rejected this argument, finding Powder Run was not in actual possession of that portion of the easement dedicated as a public street 8 © 2014 Thomson Reuters