Agenda - Planning Commission - 08/07/2014

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June 25, 2014 I Volume 8 I Issue 12 Zoning Bulletin clauses contained in the UDC's definition of "family" conflicted and therefore were void for vagueness. He also alleged that the UDC's definition of family: (1) violated his equal protection rights because it treated homeowners who did not choose to rent their homes differently than those who did rent their homes; (2) required him to inquire into familial status of prospective tenants in viola- tion of the federal Fair Housing Act ("FHA") (42 U.S.C.A. § 3601); and (3) impaired Myers' potential profit as a lessor and unconstitutionally deprived him of his economic interest in his property. The district court agreed with Myers, finding that the UDC's definition of "family" was unconstitutional in that it "exclude[d] several significant and ever-growing familial segments of our society." The City -Parish appealed. DECISION: Judgment of district court reversed, and matter remanded. The Supreme Court of Louisiana held that the UDC's definition of "family" as applied to Myers was not unconstitutional. In so holding, the court first found that the two clauses contained in the UDC's definition of "family" were not in conflict and ambiguous. Rather, the court found that the two clauses were separated by a semicolon and the word "or," and therefore meant a potential resident of a single-family dwelling in the City -Parish's "A-1" zone must meet the requirement of either the first clause or the second clause. Next, the court concluded that there was no merit to Myers' equal protec- tion claims. Again, Myers had claimed that the UDC zoning law's definition of "family" treated homeowners who chose to rent differently than homeown- ers who did not. The court concluded that circumstance did not render the ordinance unconstitutional. The court said that the Constitution's equal protec- tion clause did not require absolute equality or precisely equal advantages. Rather, it merely required equal application of laws in similar circumstances. Here, the court found that Myers failed to demonstrate that he was treated dif- ferently than any other homeowner in the "Al" district. Likewise, the court rejected Myers' assertion that the application of the UDC required him to inquire into the familial status of prospective tenants in violation of the FHA. The court explained that the FHA's prohibition on re- fusing to rent or sell housing based on "familial status" referred to a discriminatory effect on those with minor children in the household; it does not expressly prohibit a landlord from inquiring as to familial status of pro- spective tenants. In fact, noted the court, "the reasonable imposition of a nu- merical occupancy restriction would be difficult, if not impossible, to ac- complish without some inquiry in to the familial status of prospective tenants." Finally, the court rejected Myers' claims that he had been unconstitution- ally deprived of some part of his economic interest in his property because his potential prot as a lessor had been impaired by the UDC's zoning restrictions. The court found Myers had failed to present any evidence demonstrating that enforcement of the UDC's "family" denition would result in his inability to obtain "Al"compliant tenants as lessees for his property. Finding Myers had failed to prove application of the UDC's "family" defi- 8 © 2014 Thomson Reuters