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July 10, 2014 1 Volume 8 I Issue 13 <br />Zoning Bulletin <br />any portion of the land involved in the decision of the [zoning commission]." <br />Allstar argued that although the Conunission ultimately took no action with <br />respect to its property, the property nonetheless was "land involved" in its <br />decision, as the Commission specifically considered a zone change thereto. <br />The Commission maintained that because its decision was to amend the <br />zoning map with respect to certain parcels that did not include Allstar's <br />property, Allstar's property was not involved in its decision. Finding both <br />interpretations were reasonable, the court declared the statute ambiguous as <br />applied to the facts of the case, and proceeded to look to legislative history <br />and intent for clarity. <br />The court ultimately found that statutory aggrievement pursuant to § 8- <br />8(a)(1) was intended to benefit "a narrow class" of property owners, and <br />that therefore interpretation of the phrase "land involved in the decision" of <br />the commission cannot confer jurisdiction on a wide class of property own- <br />ers that constitutes "a large portion of the town." The court concluded that <br />"[i]n light of the aim of § 8-8(a)(1) to provide an avenue of appeal to a nar- <br />row class of property owners, the clearest construction of the phrase 'any <br />portion of the land involved in any decision' in this scenario is that it <br />pertains to land that (1) was the subject of the application or (2) whose zon- <br />ing classification was altered in some manner by the adopted zoning <br />change," In other words, the court concluded that when a zoning commis- <br />sion, as part of its sua sponte (i.e., self -initiated) application to amend its <br />zoning regulations or zoning map, refrains from taking action to alter in any <br />manner the zoning classification of a particular property that is not specified <br />in the application as the subject thereof, that property is not "land involved <br />in the decision" of the commission pursuant to § 8-8(a)(1). Therefore, the <br />owner of such property is not within the narrow class of persons that the <br />statute was intended to protect, held the court. Accordingly, the court agreed <br />that Allstar was not statutorily aggrieved by the Commission's decision to <br />amend its zoning map. <br />The court also found that Allstar failed to satisfy the standard for classi- <br />cal aggrievement. The court found that the Commission's decision: did not <br />pertain to Allstar's property; and did not adversely affect Allstar's interest <br />(as its property retained the same zoning classification as was previously <br />held and Allstar therefore remained in the same position as it was in prior to <br />the Commission's decision). The court concluded that Allstar, as owner of <br />property that was not the subject of a zoning application and on which the <br />Commission refrained from taking any action to alter, was not specially and <br />injuriously affected by the Commission's decision, and therefore was not <br />classically aggrieved. <br />Finding Allstar failed to establish that it was classically or statutorily ag- <br />grieved by the decision of the Commission, the court concluded that it did <br />not have standing to bring the action. <br />See also: Caltabiano v. Planning and Zoning Com'n of Town of Salem, <br />211 Conn. 662, 560 A.2d 975 (1989). <br />See also: Stanton v. Planning and Zoning Com'n, 271 Conn. 152, 856 <br />A.2d 400 (2004). <br />4 © 2014 Thomson Reuters <br />