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Page 8 -- December 24, 2003 <br /> <br />Z.B. <br /> <br />148 <br /> <br /> only a hypothetical constitutional violation. <br /> Abuse was only dealt with if and when a pattern of unlawful favoritism <br /> appeared, rather than by insisting upon a degree of rigidity found in few legal <br /> ageements. <br /> Time limits were not required when the licensing scheme at issue was con- <br /> tent-neutral. Even though specific time limits would have improved the ordi- <br /> nance, this, by itseff, was not enough to invalidate the entire law. <br /> Citation: Granite State Outdoor Advertising b~c. v. City, of St. Petersburg, il th <br /> U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, No. 02-16433 (2003). <br /> The ll rh Circuit has jurisdiction over Alabama, Florida, and Georgia. <br /> see also: New E~gtand Regional Council of Carpenters v. Kinton, 284 F. 3d 9 <br /> (2002). <br /> see also: Griffin v. Secreta~7 of' Veterans Affairs, 288 F. 3d 1309 (2002). <br /> <br /> Signs -- New landowner removes advertising sign <br />Advertising company sues village for damages <br /> <br />ILLINOIS (10/20/03) -- Beginning in 1980, Clear Channel Outdoor Inc., en- <br />tered into a series of leases to operate an outdoor advertising sign. In 2002, <br />Rubloff Oakridge Algonquin L.L.C. bought the property the sig-n stood upon. <br /> The Village of Algonquin had annexed the parcel of property the sign was <br />located on in 1995. In 2002, the village enacted an ordinance requ/ring the sign <br />be removed for faLlure to comply with the village sign code. Rubloff removed <br />the sign and destroyed it. <br /> Clear Channel sued the village' arguing the village had engaged in inverse <br />condemnation by taking down and destroying the sign. [t claimed the village <br />was liable for damages. <br />DECISION: Judgment in l~avor of village. <br /> The village did not engage in inverse condemnation. <br /> Inverse condemnation was a cause of action against a governmental defen- <br />dant to recover the value of property that was taken in fact by a governmental <br />entity, although not through eminent domain procedures. Such a claim could <br />be maintained for the destruction of personal property even though no real <br />property was taken. <br /> However, a government land use }egulation did not constitute a claim if it <br />substantially advanced legitimate state interests and did not deny an owner <br />economically viable use of the land. <br /> Clear Channel claimed the annexation of the property and the ban on bill- <br />boards deprived Clear Channel of alt economically viable use of the sign. How- <br />ever, it was Rubloff who took the sign down, destroyed it, and did not return it <br />to Clear Channel. <br /> Ultimately. the damages complained oll were not in fact caused by the village. <br />Cir~trion: Clear Channel O~trdoor b~c. v. R~.~blqO'~ Oakridge ,4lgonq~dn L.L.C., <br />U.S. D:'srricr Com'r ~br rile ~Vorrher~ District of (llinois, Eastern. Division, No. <br />03 C 3063 (2003). <br /> <br /> <br />