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be grandfathered from the operation of new zoning
<br />restrictions if it:
<br />
<br />[] fails to reflect the nature and purpose of the preexisting
<br /> nonconforming use
<br />· is different in quality or character as well as in degree
<br />[] is different in kind in its effect on the neighborhood where it
<br /> is located. [See, for example, Keith v. Saco River Corridor
<br /> Commission, 464 A.2d 150 (Me. 1983).]
<br />
<br /> To qualify as a continuation of an existing nonconforming
<br />use, a proposed use must be similar to the original use. (See, for
<br />example, Boivin v. Town ofSanford.) Ho~vever, ir need not be
<br />identical. [See, for example, Pappas v. Zoning Board of
<br />Adjustment of the Ci{y of Philadelphia, 589 A.2d 675 (Pa. 1991)
<br />(pizza restaurant with seating for 40 customers was similar to
<br />preexisting nonconforming use as sandwich shop that had very
<br />limited customer seating and sold primarily take-out food).]
<br /> In determining whether a new use bears adequate similarity
<br />to an existing nonconforming use, courts evaluate various
<br />factors, including:
<br />
<br />[] the extent to which the current use reflects the nature and
<br /> purpose of the original use;
<br />[] whether the use is different in character, nature, and kind;
<br />· whether the current use has a substantially different effect on
<br /> the neighborhood.
<br />
<br /> [See Zachs v. Zoning Board of Appea& Knowlton v. Browning-
<br /> Ferris Industries, 260 S.E.2d 232 (Va. t979); Town of
<br /> Bridgewater v. Chuckran, 217 N.E.2d 726 (Mass. 1966).]
<br /> Determining whether a questioned use meets this test
<br />necessarily involves consideration of the specific facts of each
<br />case. [See, for example, Mason v. Crooker-Mulligan, 570 A.2d
<br />12t 7 (Me. 1990).J For instance, in Ka-HurEnterprises, Inc. v.
<br />Zoning Board of Appeah of Provincetown, 661 N.E.2d 120
<br />(Mass. App. 1996), the court evaluated whether a
<br />nonconforming use as a fuel oil storage and distribution depot
<br />was terminated by a change in use. The property at issue was
<br />used as a fuel oil storage and distribution facility before the city
<br />enacted a 1951 zoning ordinance that zoned it for residential
<br />use. This use continued until t979, when the Nauset Trawling
<br />Company acquired the property and operated a fishing business
<br />and truck repair shop on the premises that lasted until August
<br />1987. The evidence showed that Nauset used the property
<br />primarily to operate its fishing business and to garage and repair
<br />trucks used for hauling fish.
<br /> While there was evidence that Nauset continued to store fuel
<br />in the two tanks on the premises and to make deliveries to its
<br />fishing vessels, out-of-town fishing boats, and a few homes of its
<br />employees, neighboring property owners testified that they
<br />never saw any fuel oil trucks enter or leave the premises. The
<br />town's building inspector also testified that, on his numerous
<br />visits to the property from 1985 to 1987, he never saw any
<br />evidence that the property was being used as a fuel storage and
<br />distribution facility. The court was unpersuaded by the fact that
<br />the property continued to be used for incidental storage of fuel
<br />oil. It concluded that a substantial change in use had occurred
<br />during Nauset's ownership, and the property lost its
<br />nonconforming use status.
<br />
<br />Mark De, n/son is a~ attornO, and author who practices environ-
<br />mental,/and-use, and zoni,g /aw i, Westwood, New Jerso'.
<br />
<br /> On the other hand, some courts have held that incidental
<br />storage activities that were part of the preexisting nonconforming
<br />use may be continued despite a change or discontinuance of the
<br />property's primary nonconforming business use. [See, for example,
<br />Toys R Us v. Silva, 639 N.Y.S.2d 881 (Sup. Ct. 1996); Hendge, v.
<br />Clackamas CounOa, 849 P.2d 1135 (Ore. App. 1993).]
<br /> Some zoning ordinances allow a change in use provided that
<br />the new use would have been permitted in the most restrictively
<br />zoned district in which the original use was allowed. [See, for
<br />example, Prudence v. Town of lthaca Zoning Board of Appeals,
<br />599 N.Y.S.2d 749 (App. Div. 1993).] Others allow changes to a
<br />less intensive nonconforming use or one that would be less
<br />detrimental to the neighborhood's character than the existing
<br />nonconforming u.se. [See, for example, McLaughlin v. O{y of
<br />Brockton, 587 N.E.2d 251 (Mass. App. 1992).] These
<br />ordinances are designed to achieve eventual eradication of
<br />nonconforming uses through gradual change to uses that are
<br />"more appropriate" to the district. [See, for example, R'opietz v.
<br />Zoning Board of Appeals for the O~y oldie Village of Clarkston,
<br />535 N.W.2d 910 (Mich. App. 1995).]
<br />
<br />Zoning ordinances seldom contain an
<br />absolute prohibition against all
<br />expansions of nonconforming uses,
<br />and some courts, most notably in
<br />Pennsylvania, have ruled that local
<br />ordinances cannot impose such an
<br />absolute Prohibition.
<br />
<br />Limitations on Expansion
<br />The rationale for prohibiting a change from one nonconforming
<br />use to another applies also to expansions of preexisting noncon-
<br />forming uses. The only nonconforming use entitled to protec-
<br />tion is the one that existed when passage of the zoning
<br />ordinance made it nonconforming. Allowing the nonconform-
<br />ing use of land and buildings to be expanded or enlarged would
<br />further exacerbate the offense to the general community' and
<br />undermine the public policy that nonconforming uses should
<br />eventually be eliminated and made to conform to the zoning
<br />laws. [See, for example, SLS Partnership v. G~y of Apple Valley.]
<br /> Zoning ordinances seldom contain an absolute prohibition
<br />against all expansions of nonconforming uses, and some courts,
<br />most notably in Pennsylvania, have ruled that local ordinances
<br />cannot impose such an absolute prohibition. [See, for example,
<br />Gatti v. Zonhtg Hearing Board of Salisbury Township, 543 A.2d
<br />622 (Pa. Commw. 1988).] Most zoning ordinances permit some
<br />expansion. Permissible expansions typically include an increase in
<br />business volume that does not include an enlargement of the size
<br />of a nonconforming building or an extension of the nonconform-
<br />ing use within the confines of the same nonconforming lot or
<br />building. Impermissible expansions commonly include structural
<br />alterations that increase the size ora nonconforming building or
<br />its expansion onto additional land that was not formerly used for
<br />that purpose. The applicable zoning ordinance determines which
<br />expansions are deemed either lawful or illegal.
<br />
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