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be grandfathered from the operation of new zoning <br />restrictions if it: <br /> <br />· fails to reflect the nature and purpose of the preexisting <br /> nonconforming use <br />· is different in quality or character as well as in degree <br />· is different in kind in its effect on the neighborhood where it <br /> is located. [See, for example, Keith v. Saco River Corridor <br /> Commission, 464 A.2d 150 (Me. 1983).] <br /> <br /> To qualify as a continuation of an existing nonconforming <br />use, a proposed use must be similar to the original use. (See, for <br />example, Boivin v. Town of Sanford.) However, it need not be <br />identical. [See, for example, Pappas v. Zoning Board of <br />Adjustment of the Oty of Philadelphia, 589 A.2d 675 (Pa. 1991) <br />(pizza restaurant with seating for 40 customers was similar to <br />preexisting nonconforming use as sandwich shop that had very <br />limited customer seating and sold primarily take-out food).] <br /> In determining whether a new use bears adequate similarity <br />to an existing nonconforming use, courts evaluate various <br />factors, including: <br /> <br />· the extent to which the current use reflects the nature and <br /> purpose of the original use; <br />[] whether the use is different in character, nature, and kind; <br />· whether the current use has a substantially different effect on <br /> the neighborhood. <br /> <br /> [See Zachs v. Zoning Board of Appealg, Knowlton v. Browning- <br /> ?erris In&~stries, 260 S.E.2d 232 (Va. 1979); Town of <br /> Bridgewater v. Chuckran, 217 N.E.2d 726 (Mass. 1966).] <br /> Determining whether a questioned use meets this test <br />necessarily involves consideration of the specific facts of each <br />case. [See, for example, Mason v. Crooker-Mulligan, 570 A.2d <br />1217 (Me. 1990).] For instance, in Ka-HurEnterprises, Inc. v. <br />Zo,ing Board of Appeals of Provincetown, 661 N.E.2d 120 <br />(Mass. App. 1996), the court evaluated whether a <br />nonconforming use as a fuel oil storage and distribution depot <br />was terminated by a change in use. The property at issue was <br />used as a fuel oil storage and distribution facility before the city <br />enacted a 1951 zoning ordinance that zoned it for residential <br />use. This use continued until 1979, when the Nauset Trawling <br />Company acquired the property and operated a fishing business <br />and truck repair shop on the premises that lasted until August <br />1987. The evidence showed that Nauset used the property <br />primarily to operate its fishing business and to garage and repair <br />trucks used for hauling fish. <br /> While there was evidence that Nauset continued to store fuel <br />in the two tanks on the premises and to make deliveries ro irs <br />fishing vessels, out-of-town fishing boats, and a few homes of its <br />employees, neighboring property owners testified that they <br />never saw any fuel oil truc 'ks enter or leave the premises. The <br />town's building inspector also testified that, on his numerous <br />visits to the property from 1985 to 1987, he never saw any <br />evidence that the property was being used as a fuel storage and <br />distribution facility. The court was unpersuaded by the fact that <br />the property c6ntinued to be used for incidental storage of fuel <br />oil. It concluded that a substantial change in use had occurred <br />during Nauset's ownership, and the property lost its <br />nonconforming use status. <br /> <br />~rark Dennison is an attorney a,d author who practices en viron- <br />mental, land-use, and zoning law in Westwood, New Jersey. <br /> <br /> On the other hand, some courts have held that incidental <br />storage activities that were part of the preexisting nonconforming <br />use may be continued despite a change or discontinuance of the <br />property's primary nonconforming business use. [See, for example, <br />Toys R Us v. Silva, 639 N.Y.S.2d 88t (Sup. Ct. 1996); Hendgen v. <br />Clackamas County, 849 P.2d 1135 (Ore. App. 1993).] <br /> Some zoning ordinances allow a change in use provided that <br />the new use would have been permitted in the most restrictively <br />zoned district in which the original use was allowed. [See, for <br />example, Prudence v. Town of Ithaca Zoning Board of Appeals, <br />599 N.Y.S.2d 749 (App. Div. 1993).] Others allow changes to a <br />less intensive nonconforming use or one that would be less <br />detrimental to the neighborhood's character than the existing <br />nonconforming use. [See, for example, McLaughlin v. O~y of <br />Brockton, 587 N.E.2d 251 (Mass. App. 1992).] These <br />ordinances are designed to achieve eventual eradication of <br />nonconforming uses through gradual change to uses that are <br />"more appropriate" to the district. [See, for example, Kopietz v. <br />Zoning Board of Appeals for the Cig of the Village of Clarkston, <br />535 N.W. 2d 910 (Mich. App. 1995).] <br /> <br />Zoning ordinances seldom contain an <br />absolute prohibition against ali <br />expansions of nonconforming uses, <br />and some courts, most notably in <br />Pennsylvania, have ruled that local <br />ordinances cannot impose such an <br />absolute prohibition. <br /> <br />Limitations on Expansion <br />The rationale for prohibiting a change from one nonconforming <br />use to another applies also to expansions of preexisting noncon- <br />forming uses. The only nonconforming use entitled to protec- <br />tion is the one that existed when passage of the zoning <br />ordinance made it nonconforming. Allowing the nonconform- <br />ing use of land and buildings to be expanded or enlarged would <br />further exacerbate the offense to the general community and <br />undermine the public policy that nonconforming uses should <br />eventually be eliminated and made to conform to the zoning <br />laws. [See, for example, SLS Partnership v. City of Apple Valley.] <br /> Zoning ordinances seldom contain an absolute prohibition <br />against all expansions of nonconforming uses, and some courts, <br />most notably in Pennsylvania, have ruled that local ordinances <br />cannot impose such an absolute prohibition. [See, for example, <br />Gatti v. Zoning Hearing Board of Salisbmy Township, 543 A.2d <br />622 (Pa. Commw. 1988).] Most zoning ordinances permit some <br />expansion. Permissible expansions typically include an increase in <br />business volume that does not include an enlargement of the size <br />of a nonconforming building or an extension of the nonconform- <br />ing use within the confines of the same nonconforming lot or <br />building. Impermissible expansions commonly include structural <br />alterations that increase the size of a nonconforming building or <br />its expansion onto additional land that was not formerly used for <br />that purpose. The applicable zoning ordinance determines which <br />expansions are deemed either lawful or illegal. <br /> <br /> <br />