Agenda - Planning Commission - 11/06/2014

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October 10, 2014 1 Volume 8 1 Issue 19 Zoning Bulletin ner's replacement of mobile homes after existing mobile homes were removed was a permissible continuation of the nonconforming use of a mobile home park. The case also addressed the validity of a city's resolution interpreting an ordinance to mean that a nonconforming use of a mobile home park must be considered on a lot -by -lot basis. The Background/Facts: Cleveland Mobile Home Community LLC ("CMHC") had operated a mobile home park (the "Park") in the City of Richland (the "City") in Rankin County, Mississippi (the "County") since the 1950s. The Park contained 138 concrete pads on which mobile homes could be placed. The pads were rented to tenants. When the tenants left, CMHC would seek successive renters to bring in their mobile home. At some point, CMHC's property was annexed by the City. At the time of the annexation, the Park was classified as an "I-1, Light Industrial Zoning" property. Under the City's ordinances, industrial property could not be used for residential purposes. Since the Community rented spaces to mobile -home residents, the property was technically used for residential purposes, which was a nonconform- ing use of the land. With regard to nonconforming uses, § 405 of the City's ordinances recited that the intent of the ordinance was to cover nonconformities as they may exist in: (1) lots, (2) uses of land and structures, (3) structures, and (4) characteristics of use. Section 405.1 stated that the City intended to allow "non[ ]confoiuiities to continue until they are removed, but not to encourage their survival. It is further the intent of this [o]rdinance that non[ ]conformities shall not be enlarged upon, expanded[,] or extended, [nor] be used as grounds for adding other [s]tructures or uses prohibited elsewhere in the same district." Although CMHC had been considered a nonconforming use of land contain- ing mobile homes, the City never enforced § 405, and CMHC regularly moved new mobile homes into the Park without objection from the City. In April 2011, the zoning administration informed CMHC by written letter that § 405 would be enforced from that point forward, and that new mobile homes would not be al- lowed to occupy empty spaces after existing mobile homes were removed. Upon receipt of the letter, Cleveland requested a hearing before the Board. The Board held the requested hearing, and ultimately approved a resolution that stated as follows: "In the event a mobile home or similar vehicle is removed from its then[ -]present location in the Cleveland Mobile Home Park, another mobile home or similar vehicle shall not be placed on the vacated site." CMHC appealed to the county circuit court. That court upheld the Board's resolution. CMHC again appealed. Among other things, CMHC argued that it had a vested right to continue the nonconforming use of the property and that the continued placement of mobile homes on the property was a permissible continuation of the nonconforming use. CMHC further argued that enforcement of the City's resolu- tion allowed the City to take CMHC's property "lot by lot," and that unconstitu- tional taking entitled CMHC to compensation and damages. The City maintained that the placement of mobile homes on lots at the park as replacement for mobile homes that had vacated was a nonpermitted extension of the nonconforming use because it prolonged the life of the nonconforming use. The City interpreted the ordinance to mean that the nonconforming use must be considered on a lot -by -lot (or pad -by -pad) basis. 8 ©2014 Thomson Reuters