Agenda - Planning Commission - 01/08/2015

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November 25, 2014 !Volume 8 1 Issue 22 Zoning Bulletin cision from the City's zoning authority in the form of a variance or Zoning Board of Appeals decision. The court explained that with regard to land use decisions, claims were not ripe until the government entity charged with implementing the regulations had reached a final decision regarding the application of the regulations to the property at issue. The court said the purpose of the ripeness requirement is to ensure that a dispute has generated injury significant enough to satisfy the case or controversy requirement of Article III of the U.S. Constitution. (Article III authorizes the federal courts to hear actual cases and controversies only.) To be ripe for adjudication, the injury must be "concrete and particularized," "actual or imminent," not "merely speculative," said the court. Sunrise had argued that the final -decision requirement did not apply to zon- ing challenges under the ADA based on allegations of intentional discrimina- tion because those "cause[d] a uniquely immediate injury" rendering such claims "ripe from the act of. discrimination." The court acknowledged that argument had some appeal since, generally, when a public official violates constitutional rights, related claims may proceed to federal court without state -remedies first being exhausted. However, in the case of land use disputes, the court "declin[ed] to adopt a categorical rule excepting from the final -decision requirement any case in which a landowner alleges intentional discrimination." The court noted that whether or not the rejection of Sunrise's special permit request was the product of discriminatory motivation, the remedy was not necessarily the issuance of a permit to Sunrise. The court further noted that if Sunrise proceeded with its application, "the rejection may be reversed, and the project may be permitted to proceed—or the application may be rejected on other, non-discriminatory grounds." Only after a final decision was rendered would it be known whether the allegedly discriminatory decision of the of- ficial had any effect at all on Sunrise's application, said the court. The court concluded: "[T]herefore . . . a plaintiff alleging discrimination in the context of a land -use dispute is subject to the final -decision requirement unless he can show that he suffered some injury independent of the challenged land -use decision." Here, the court found that the Commissioner's determination that Sunrise's facility did not qualify as a "community residence" did not give rise to an injury independent of the City's ultimate land -use decision. As to Sunrise's claim that the City failed to reasonably accommodate it and its clients as required by the ADA, the court held that Sunrise's failure to pursue a variance or to appeal the Commissioner's determination deprived the City of the op- portunity to accommodate Sunrise and its clients through the City's established procedures. Accordingly, the court concluded that Sunrise's claims were not yet ripe for adjudication. See also:Williamson County Regional Planning Com'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 105 S. Ct. 3108, 87 L. Ed. 2d 126 (1985). See also: Jackson v. Okaloosa County, Fla., 21 F.3d 1531, 1541 (11th Cir. 1994). See also: Gr come Resources Ltd., L.L.C. v. Parish of Jefferson, 234 F.3d 192, 199-200 (5th Cir. 2000) 4 © 2014 Thomson Reuters •