Agenda - Council - 12/20/1983 - Laserfiche WebLink

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I I I I ! i I I ,I I I I Page -3- It is not enough for the defendants to say over and over again merely that the law is rationally related to a legitimate legislative purpose. This whole litigation centers on whether the Local Government. Aid Statute is rationally, related, i.e. does achieve, promote and further, a legitimate purpose. The court cannot decide whether a given purpose is rationally related to the statutory scheme unless testimony is taken and evidence presented. In the affidavit submitted by Edward Robinson, the plaintiffs have taken direct issue with the proposition that this legislation is rationally related to a legitimate purpose. Plaintiffs intend to show at trial, and Robinson's affidavit supports this, that the legislation does not achieve, promote, or further its legislative purpose and that accordingly it is not rationally related to that purpose or purposes. As both plaintiffs and defendants agree, the test under the Minnesota Constitution is the same as the Federal Equal Protection test. The Minnesota Supreme Court in another case cited by defendants has again reasserted its formulation of the rational basis standard. In AFCME Councils 6, 14, 65 and 96, AFL-CIO v. Sundquist, 338 NW2d 560 (Minn. 1983) at page 570, footnote 12, the court repeated the three prong test which plaintiffs originally cited to the court on page 3 of their Memorandum. Citing from the United States Supreme Court, the court noted the application of the standard involves two basic inquiries: "'In determining whether a challenged classifica- tion is ~-ationally related to achievement of a legitimate state purpose, we must answer two questions: (1) Does the challenged legislation have a legitimate purpose; and (2) Was it reason- able for the lawmakers to believe that the use of the challenged classification would promote that purpose?" (emphasis supplied) Id. 338 NW2d at 570. The numbered questions posed by the court only aid in a determina- tion of whether the law achieves its purpose. Even defendants' citation of L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law (1978) is incomplete. In Tribe's discussion of the basic requirements of minimum rationality under equal protection, he states the scope of review necessary under such a challenge as: "To provide such scope, equal protection came to be seen as requiring 'some rationality in the nature of the class singled out,' with 'rationality' tested by the classifications ability to ~erve the purposes intended by the legislative or administrative rule " 5~ iDe at 995.