Agenda - Council - 12/20/1983 - Laserfiche WebLink

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,I I 'i Village of Burnsville v. Onischuk, 222 N.W.2d 523, 531 (1974) (emphasis added; citation omitted), quoting from San Antonio School District v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 40, 93 S. Ct. 1278, 1300 (1973). See also Matter of McCannel, 301N.W.2d at 917. The United States I I ! I I Supreme Court's explanation of the scope of the equal protection clause in McGowan v. Maryland amplifies this concept: The constitutional safeguard is offended only if the classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objective. State legislatures are presumed to have acted within their constitutional power dispite the fact that, in practice, their laws result in some inequality. A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify_ i~. 366 U.S. 420, 425, Ri S. Ct. 1101, 1105 (1961)(emphasis added). I I Plaintiffs' challenge to the local government aid formula cannot survive analysis under these constitutional standards. The obvious purpose of the local government aid law is "to provide property tax relief to local units of government." ~983 Act § 14. Unquestionably, the reduction in reliance on local property taxes by the distribution of general state revenues is a legitimate ,I I I and proper governmental objective. The local government aid formula provides a rational approach to the effectuation of that purpose. It is not wholly arbitrary; nor is it hostile and oppressive. While plaintiffs and others may conceive of alternative formulas that would also be reasonable approaches to the problem, because the alternatives chosen by the legislature are not totally irrational, they pass constitutional muster. -18-