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The use of negotiated zoning raises impor- <br />tant legal and policy questions. On the re§al <br />side, the provision of "unrelated" benefits is <br />unlikely to be challeng'ed by Ihe developer who <br />enthusiastically or reluc~.antly agrees to the con- <br />ditiens. However, it could be challenged by con- <br />stituencies in the ciWwho are/eft out of the <br />deal or are still intent on stopping the develop- <br />ment altogether. To the extent the state zonin~ <br />statute or local ordinance is murky on authori- <br />zation for this sort of deal-making, the lawsuit <br />may have extended legs. <br /> From a policy viewpoint, this widespread <br />practice en§enders mixed reviews. On the one <br />hand, the idea that ever/thing is on the robie <br />and that parties can create a win-win outcome <br />by expandin§ the pie of considerations, and <br />that both sides can make a Coasean bargain <br />(named after the Chica§o Nobel-prize-winning <br />economist, Ronaid Cease, and i~is article, <br />"The Problem of Social Cost"), would be <br />applauded not only by "Gettin§ r.o '/es" enthu- <br />siasts, but by nee-classical economists as <br />well. On the other hand, the practice raises <br />concerns aPout whether projects that shouid <br />be turned down on the basis of phvsicaJ plan- <br /> <br />ning criteria are being approved on the basis <br />of buyoffs for selected neighborhood con- <br />stituencies, or even for ci~wide benefits unto- <br />lated to the proposed development's impact. <br />Furthermore, unlike formal incentive zoning <br />where the terms of the deal are there, for bet- <br />ter or worse, for observers to evaluate, ne§pti- <br />ated zoning lacks the baseline elements of a <br />matter-of-right development from which the <br />ne§otiat[on proceeds. Nothin§ is fixed in <br />advance, so the to-ing and fro-lng of the <br />negotiation becomes untethered to fixed, <br />transparent criteria. At its worst, negotiated <br />zoning becomes a free-for-all that undermines <br />confidence in the entire system of iand-use <br />regulation. <br /> <br />EMBR;~,C]J"tG :~GC]AL ~QIJI'P! <br /> <br />One pt the most interesting changes to zonin§ <br />over the past ~-5 ,/ears has been the expan- <br />sion of its purposes from traditional physical <br />piannin§ to social equity goals. Indeed, in big <br />cities more than suburbs, zoning has concep- <br />tually, if not empirically, moved from "exctu- <br />sionary" ~o "level playin§ field" to "inc[usion- <br />ary" in its approach to those [ess well-off in <br /> <br />society, especially with re§ard to housing. In <br />its t92.6 Village o[ ~uclid v. Ambler Realty <br />Company (272 U.5. 365) decision, the U.S. <br />Supreme Court celebrated Euclid's decision to <br />separate single-family from multi-family hous- <br />lng, referring to apartment houses as mere <br />parasites attempting to suck advantages from <br />single-family neighborhoods. The suburban <br />experience of zoning, even today, might still <br />be characterized as one of exclusion, where <br />zoning's use, shape, and bulk instruments <br />are played to make development of affordable <br />housing difficult, if not impossible. The indu- <br />sionary efforts of today are hardly dominant, <br />but they are increasingly found in larger cities <br />across the country and reflect the realization <br />that zoning, along with more direct public <br />subsidies, nas the possibility of contri'buting <br />to the affordaPle housin§ pot. <br /> <br /> The most celebrated social equity zoning <br />techniques are I. inl(ag'e and indusionary zen- <br />in§. Under these pro§rams, cities ask devel- <br />opers to provide or pay for affordable housing <br />and other redistribudve social benefits, nor- <br />maily as a condition for development <br />approval tess often as part of a purely velum <br /> <br />ZONING PRACTICE <br />AMERICAN pLANNING ASSOCIATION J page <br /> <br /> <br />