Agenda - Planning Commission - 06/04/2015

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May 10, 2015 1 Volume 9 Issue 9 Zoning Bulletin apply to the first topic because that prior case had been "finally adjudicated" before the executive session and, thus, was no longer pending. With respect to the second topic, the alleged permit violations, the FOIC ruled that the exception in § 1-200(6)(B) did not apply because, at the time of the execu- tive session, there was no pending claim or litigation relating to those al- leged permit violations, and the PZC had not considered during the execu- tive session filing an action against Handsome for those violations. Consequently, the FOIC ruled that the PZC had violated the act's open meetings requirement, as provided in General Statutes § 1-225(a), by convening the executive session. The PZC appealed. The trial court reversed the FOIC's decision. The trial court agreed with the FOIC on topic one that the permit extension issue had been finally adjudicated and thus did not justify convening the executive session. However, the trial court disagreed with the FOIC on issue two, and held that the PZC properly convened its executive session to discuss the alleged permit violations because that constituted "consideration of action to enforce or implement legal relief or a legal right," which fell within the purview of the pending claims or pending litigation exception. The FOIC, Handsome, and the Cascellas appealed. The Supreme Court of Connecticut transferred their appeals to the Supreme Court. DECISION: Judgment of superior court reversed and matter remanded. Agreeing with the FOIC, the Supreme Court of Connecticut held that the PZC was not justified in convening an executive session under the pending claims or pending litigation exception to FOIA's opens meetings requirement. On appeal, the PZC had argued that, under the FOIA exception, a public agency could convene an executive session to generally "[consider] action to enforce or implement legal relief or a legal right" regardless of whether there was a certain pending or prospective legal proceeding to which the agency was or would be a party. The PZC thus asserted.that, because its members' discussion of their zoning enforcement options against Hand- some constituted "consideration of action to enforce or implement legal relief or a legal right" (General Statutes § 1-200(9)(C)), its executive ses- sion fell within the scope of the pending claims or pending litigation excep- tion of § 1-200(6)(B). The court rejected the PZC's interpretation of § 1-200(6)(B) and (9)(C) and instead agreed with the FOIC that a public agency may convene an ex- ecutive session under the pending claims or pending litigation exception only to discuss matters that are in connection with a prospective or pending lawsuit or legal proceeding. More specifically, the court reviewed the language of § 1-200(6)(B) and (9)(C) and found it to be "plain and unambiguous." Reading the statute as a whole, the court concluded that, in order for § 1200(6)(B) to apply, the public agency either must be bringing or defending a prospective or pending lawsuit in court or some other legal 4 © 2015 Thomson Reuters