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Zoning Bulletin August 10, 2015 1 Volume 9 1 Issue 15 <br />case law, that each of those statutes authorized disparate -impact claims. <br />In those cases, the court had held that "antidiscrimination laws should be <br />construed to encompass disparate -impact claims when their text refers to <br />the consequences of actions and not just to the mindset of actors, and <br />where that interpretation is consistent with statutory purpose." <br />Looking at § 804(a) of the FHA—which again states that it is unlawful <br />to "refuse to sell or rent . . . or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a <br />dwelling to a person because of race" or other protected characteristic— <br />the court found that the "results -oriented phrase `otherwise make un- <br />available' " referred to the consequences of an action rather than the <br />actor's intent. The court also found that phrase was equivalent in func- <br />tion and purpose to similar phrasing found in Title VII and the ADEA. <br />The court also found that interpretation of the FHA text was consistent <br />with its statutory purpose—to eradicate discriminatory practices in the <br />Nation's housing sector. The court concluded that "[r]ecognition of <br />disparate -impact liability under the FHA plays an important role in <br />uncovering discriminatory intent: it peg nits plaintiffs to counteract un- <br />conscious prejudices and disguised animus that escape easy classification <br />as disparate treatment." "These unlawful practices," said the court, <br />"include zoning laws and other housing restrictions that function unfairly <br />to exclude minorities from certain neighborhoods without any sufficient <br />justification." <br />In its decision, the court also highlighted, however, the need to <br />properly limit disparate -impact liability "to avoid serious constitutional <br />questions that might arise under the FHA" (e.g., if such liability were <br />imposed based solely on a showing of a statistical disparity). The court <br />said that "[a]n important and appropriate means of ensuring that <br />disparate -impact liability is properly limited is to give housing authori- <br />ties and private developers leeway to state and explain the valid interest <br />their policies serve." Thus, a disparate -impact claim relying on a statisti- <br />cal disparity must fail if the plaintiff cannot point to a defendant's policy <br />or policies causing that disparity, said the court. The court provided fur- <br />ther guidance on disparate -impact liability stating that: policies, whether <br />governmental or private, "are not contrary to the disparate -impact <br />requirement unless they are `artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barri- <br />ers,' " and noting that when disparate -impact liability is found, remedial <br />orders of courts "should concentrate on the elimination of the offending <br />practice," with race -neutral remedies (as opposed to remedial orders that <br />impose racial targets or quotas, which might raise difficult constitutional <br />questions). <br />The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals for <br />the Fifth Circuit and remanded the matter for further proceedings consis- <br />tent with the Supreme Court's opinion. <br />See also: Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 91 S. Ct. 849, 28 L. <br />Ed. 2d 158, 3 Fair Dupl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 175, 3 Dupl. Prac. Dec. <br />(CCH) P 8137, 88 Pub. Util. Rep. 3d (PUR) 90 (1971). <br />© 2015 Thomson Reuters 5 <br />