Agenda - Planning Commission - 11/12/2015

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October 25, 2015 1 Volume 9 I Issue 20 Zoning Bulletin The Supreme Court of Connecticut transferred the appeal to itself. DECISION: Judgment of superior court reversed, and matter remanded. The Supreme Court of Connecticut agreed with Hunter Ridge, finding the trial court erred in issuing an injunction in the context of this zoning appeal. The court held that the Act—specifically § 22a-18(a)—does not give a trial court independent authority to enter an injunction in an administrative ap- peal involving an intervention under § 22a-19. Instead, the court declared, an intervenor under § 22a-19 must take the proceeding as he or she finds it at the time of the intervention. In other words, the Act does not permit the intervenor to expand the remedies allowed in the underlying proceeding; it only allows the intervenor to raise those claims for relief otherwise permitted in the existing proceeding. Thus, only where the underlying proceeding would permit the use of equitable remedies by the court may the court issue an injunction in a proceeding in which someone intervenes. Otherwise, a person who seeks an injunction to prevent conduct that would violate the Act must seek such relief through an independent action brought under § 22a-16. In so holding, the court found the language of the relevant statutes was "ambiguous as to whether the grant of equitable power in § 22a -18(a) ap- plie[d] in actions in which a party has intervened pursuant to § 22a-19." The court did find that, in permitting the recovery of costs and attorney's fees when a party obtains declaratory and equitable relief against a defendant in an intervention under § 22a-19, the Act clearly contemplated that equitable relief may be available in certain interventions, including: in enforcement proceedings brought by town zoning officers or by the Commissioner of Energy and Environmental Protection. Still, after analyzing related, prior case law, the court found that § 22a - 18(a) (equitable relief) does not apply to all interventions, but only to some types of proceedings covered by § 22a-19. The court found that prior case law showed that "an intervention under § 22a-19 is not intended to displace or expand the statutes that govern agency powers and procedures. Instead, § 22a-19 simply allows an intervenor to raise environmental concerns within the statutory limitations placed on the agency." Thus, said the court, "[i]f the environmental concerns that a party wishes to raise are not within the scope of the agency's statutory power, the party must bring a separate action under § 22a-16." (Although the cases that the court reviewed addressed the impact of § 22a-19 on the powers of an agency, the court found that they applied "with equal force to the powers of a trial court.") Thus, although § 22a -19(a)(1) allows some types of equitable relief, the court emphasized that a trial court hearing a zoning appeal ordinarily does not have the authority to enter equitable relief, "but rather, is extremely limited in its powers." The court explained that "[p]ennitting an intervenor to raise claims for injunctive relief in an administrative or zoning appeal would entirely change the character of the proceedings by potentially requir- ing the trial court to engage in fact-finding and empowering it to grant sweep- ing relief not otherwise peunitted in such a limited proceeding." Accordingly, the court concluded that the legislature did not intend for 10 © 2015 Thomson Reuters