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February 25, 2015 1 Volume 9 1 Issue 4 Zoning Bulletin On January 30, 2012, the ZBA approved the minutes of the January 25 meet- ing, which memorialized the votes from the January 25 meeting. The ZBA also voted to accept a written Notice of Final Decision on the Beckfords' appeal. On March 5, 2012, the Beckfords again appealed, filing a complaint in superior court. Pisgah and the Town moved to dismiss the Beckfords' complaint. They argued that the Beckfords' appeal to court was untimely in that it was filed outside of the 45-day statutory appeal period (30-A M.R.S. § 2691(3)(G)). They contended that the statutory appeal period started on January 25 when the ZBA voted to deny the appeal at the public hearing. The Superior Court disagreed and denied the motion to dismiss. The court held that the statutory appeal period started on January 30 when the ZBA issued its written findings and decision, not on January 25 when it voted to deny the appeal. The court also ultimately vacated the Board's decision to approve the permit on the ground that the Town misapplied the requirements of the Town Land Use Ordinance. The Town and Pisgah appealed, and the Beckfords cross -appealed. DECISION: Judgment of superior court vacated, and matter remanded. The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine held that the statutory appeal period began on January 25 when the ZBA voted to deny on the appeal, not on January 30 when the ZBA issued its written findings and decision on the denial. Accord- ingly, the court concluded that the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the Beckfords' appeal from the ZBA's decision. In so holding, the court analyzed the plain language of the governing statute. The statute, 30-A M.R.S. § 2691, which governs municipal boards of appeals, provides: "Any party may take an appeal within 45 days of the date of the vote on the original decision . . .." Based on that language, the court noted that the timeliness of the Beckfords' appeal hinged on whether the ZBA's "vote on the original decision" occurred on January 25 or January 30. The court found that § 2691 was clear and unambiguous, providing that the time period for filing an appeal runs from "the vote." The court found that § 2691 "[did] not include any language that directly or indirectly suggest[ed] that to be sufficient to invoke the appeal period, a vote must be accompanied by issuance of a written decision." The court stated that the issuance of written findings is an event that is distinct from the vote itself even when a municipal ordinance requires a zoning board of appeals to issue a written decision. The court held that the statutory appeal period runs from the date of a board of ap- peal's final public vote, regardless of whether or when a written decision is issued. Here, the court found that it was the January 25 vote that triggered the appeal period, not the January 30 vote. The court found the January 25 vote was a pub- lic vote on each of the issues on appeal, publicly making a decision on the ap- peal and announced at the public meeting. In comparison, the January 30 vote was only a vote by the ZBA to approve the text of a document memorializing the decision that had already been made, found the court. Consequently, the court concluded that the Beckfords' appeal to the superior court, which was filed 50 days after the January 25 vote, was untimely. Accord- ingly, the court held that the superior court did not have jurisdiction over the 8 ©2015 Thomson Reuters