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December 10, 20151 Volume 91 Issue 23 Zoning Bulletin <br />General Assembly's enactment of the "First Class City Home Rule Act" <br />("Home Rule Act"), which governed zoning appeals in the City. <br />Objector responded that FT's challenge to his standing should have been <br />raised before the Board. Because FT did not oppose his participation before <br />the Board, Objector argued that the challenge was waived. In support of this <br />argument, Objector relied on a line of cases that arose under the Municipali- <br />ties Planning Code ("MPC"), 53 P.S. §§ 10908(3). Section 908(3) of the <br />MPC provides that the parties to a hearing before the local zoning hearing <br />board include any individuals or entities who are "permitted to appear by the <br />board." (53 P.S. § 10908(3).) <br />The trial court granted FT's motion to quash and dismissed Objector's <br />appeal. The trial court found it irrelevant that FT had not objected to <br />Objector's standing to appear before the Board. Rather, the trial court <br />perceived that the issue of standing to appeal from the Board to the trial <br />court was distinct, could not have been raised previously, and therefore was <br />not waived. Substantively, the trial court found that Objector was not ag- <br />grieved because he had failed to demonstrate that the variances would injure <br />any of his interests. <br />Objector appealed. The Commonwealth Court reversed the trial court. It <br />held that FT's objection to Objector's standing to appeal to the trial court <br />had been waived because FT did not raise it before the Board. <br />FT appealed, and the City filed a brief in support of FT. <br />DECISION: Judgment of Commonwealth Court reversed, and mat- <br />ter remanded. <br />The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania agreed with the City and with FT <br />that because the ability to appear and participate before the Board is distinct <br />from standing to appeal the Board's decision to the trial court, the first time <br />FT could challenge Objector's standing to appeal in this case was when <br />Objector took the appeal to the trial court. The court concluded that FT's <br />challenge to Objector's standing was, therefore, timely. <br />In so holding the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania explained that because <br />the zoning appeal arose in the City of Philadelphia, it was governed by the <br />Philadelphia Home Rule Charter, 351 Pa.Code'§§ 1.1-100-12.12-503, <br />adopted pursuant to Home Rule Act, and the Philadelphia Zoning Code. The <br />Supreme Court of Pennsylvania found that the Commonwealth Court had <br />erred when looking at § 908(3) of the MPC, which requires an objector to <br />appear before a zoning board and be considered a party in order to be <br />adversely affected by the zoning board and have to have standing to appeal a <br />zoning board decision. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania clarified that the <br />MPC does not apply to the City of Philadelphia, which, as noted, is governed <br />instead by the Home Rule Act and the Philadelphia Zoning Code. <br />The Philadelphia Zoning Code, unlike the MPC, provides no definition of <br />who is a party before the Board and does not limit who may appear and par- <br />ticipate in a zoning hearing, noted the court. "There is no requirement in <br />Philadelphia similar to that in Section 908(3) of the MPC that one must be <br />permitted by the [B]oard to appear as a party as a prerequisite to standing " <br />10 © 2015 Thomson Reuters <br />