Agenda - Planning Commission - 07/21/2016

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Zoning Bulletin May 25, 2016 I Volume 10 I Issue 10 Looking at the Sign Ban under an "inteinuediate scrutiny" standard, the court found it satisfied that standard in that the regulations advanced the governmental interests of traffic safety and aesthetics. While the Sign Ban regulations may not have been the "least restrictive means" at achieving the governmental objectives, the court found it was "a reason- able fit between the legislature's ends and the means chosen to ac- complish those ends." Moreover, the court found "no basis to conclude that any of [the] exceptions [to the Sign Ban] `work[ed] at inexorable cross-purposes' to the [S]ign [B]an." In other words, the court found that the exceptions to the Sign Ban did not mean it was underinclusive and that the Sign Ban would fail to achieve its objectives. In sum, the court concluded that, "[c]onsistent with the many authori- ties finding no constitutional infinnuity under the First Amendment in the distinction between offsite and onsite signs," the City's Sign Ban, likewise, did not violate the free speech provision of the California Constitution. See also: Metro Lights, L.L.C. v. City of Los Angeles, 551 F.3d 898 -(9th Cir. 2009) (finding the city did not violate the First Amendment "by prohibiting most offsite commercial advertising while simultaneously contracting with a private party to permit sale of such advertising at city - owned transit stops'). See also: World Wide Rush, LLC v. City of Los Angeles, 606 F.3d 676 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that the city's ban on freeway facing billboards was not an unconstitutionally underinclusive restriction on commercial speech, and that the exceptions to the ban for billboards at one location and in a special use district did not undermine the city's traffic safety and aesthetics objectives). See also: Vanguard Outdoor, LLC v. City of Los Angeles, 648 F.3d 737 (9th Cir. 2011) (concluding that the city's distinction between offsite and onsite signs "has been repeatedly upheld as content -neutral and valid," and rejecting the plaintiff's contention that the protections for commercial speech under the California Constitution are different from the protections under the First Amendment). See also: Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Service Com- mission of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 100 S. Ct. 2343, 65 L. Ed. 2d 341, 6 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1497, 34 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 178 (1980). See also: Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 101 S. Ct. 2882, 69 L. Ed. 2d 800, 16 Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1057, 11 Envtl. L. Rep. 20600 (1981). Case Note: In its decision, the court acknowledged that "heightened scrutiny" is appropri- ate for commercial regulations that are content- and speaker -based. ©2016 Thomson Reuters 9