Agenda - Planning Commission - 07/21/2016

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Zoning Builetin June 10, 2016 I Volume 10 { Issue 11 the Board "reasonably concluded that CBDA's modified application was not `materially different' from CBDA's initial site plan application." The court found it was clear that the Board's principal concern in denying the first site plan application —the permanency and relative immobility of the proposed park model units —was not resolved in the second site plan application as park model units could still occupy 219 campsites and be able "to stay year round" at the site. See also: Fisher v. City of Dover, 120 N.H. 187, 412 A.2d 1024 (1980). See also: Hill -Grant Living Trust v. Kearsarge Lighting Precinct, 159 N.H. 529, 536, 986A.2d 662 (2009). Case Note: Notably, the Board had acknowledged that if CBDA had prohibited the use of park models on the campsites or limited the time that each campsite could be occupied by a park model, CBDA's proposal would have been materially dif- ferent (and thus not subject to the subsequent application doctrine) because it would have resolved its concern about the permanency of the campsites. VarianceBoardgrants variance to pawn shop owner, allowing shop within normally prohibited distance of residential district Competing pawn shop owner challenges variance, arguing it's actually an un- authorized use variance and was improperly granted Citation: Pawn 1st, LLC v. City of Phoenix, 2016 WL 1427649 (Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 12016) ARIZONA (04/12/16)—This case addressed the issue of whether a variance issued as an area variance was actually an unauthorized use variance. The case also addressed the issue of whether a zoning board exceeded its authority in granting a variance, thus voiding the variance. The Background/Facts: William Jachimelc, doing business as Central Pawn ("Jachimelc"), entered into a lease with an option to © 2016 Thomson Reuters 5