Agenda - Planning Commission - 09/01/2016

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Zoning Bulletin July 10, 2016 ( Volume 10 1 Issue 13 i The court remanded that factual issue to the district court to decide. In doing so,the court noted that RLMPA did not allow the City to treat more favorably land uses-that, like TOL, failed to maximize the government's income-tax revenue. The court also noted that the RLU- IPA's Equal Terms Provision forbids a locality from discriminating against religious institutions and assemblies, regardless of time, place, and manner. "In other words, it is not a defense that a government discriminates against religious assemblies and institutions only in part, rather than all, of its jurisdiction." Further, the court noted that RLU- IPA's test is not satisfied by a government rationale of"we want A [i.e.,here,higher income-tax revenue],we think land use B leads to A, thus we regulate to privilege land use B." See also:Midrash Sephardi,Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214 (11th Cir. 2004). i See also: Lighthouse Institute for Evangelism, Inc. v. City of Long Branch, SIO F.3d 253 (3d Cir. 2007). See also: Elijah Group, Inc. v. City of Leon Valley, Tex., 643 F.3d 419 (5th Cir. 2011). i Case Note: ; While the Sixth Circuit remanded the factual issue to the district court to decide, the Sixth Circuit hinted that it appeared that the assemblies and institu- tions that were more favorably treated by the City(as compared to TOL)were I similarly situated to the regulation" (and thus the unequal treatment would be in violation ofRLUIPA's Equal Terms Provision). G r Case Note: i In its decision, the Sixth Circuit observed that the City could ensure com- mercial use of the prroperty at issue without violating RLUIPA. The court said the City could use eminent domain and force TOL to sell the Property to the City, allowing the City to then sell the land to a buyer that the City thinks of- fers superior economic benefits. G r i, i ©2016 Thomson Reuters 5 j G I`