Agenda - Planning Commission - 07/01/2004

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Country Joe, Inc., et al., Respondents, vs. City of Eagan, petitioner, Appellant. C8-95~228... Page 3. of 7 In Almquist v. Town of Marshan, we upheld the town's adoption ora zoning moratorium against a landowner's contention that, by expressly extending the authority to adopt such a moratorium to county boards while remaining silent on the power of municipalities to adopt similar moratoria, the legislature evinced an intent to witlthold the authority from municipalities. 308 Minn. 52, 64, 245 N.W.2d 819, 825 (1976). We rejected the negative inference urged by the landowner, noting that, among other arguments, "an equally persuasive argument may be made that the legislature * * * simply assumed that municipalities had inherent power to enact such ordinances." Id. Thus, the city urges that after Almqzdst, absent an explicit expression of a contrary purpose by the legislature, cities are presumptively endowed with broad municipal planning powers--including the power to £mance municipal improvements-- subject only to the limitations of good faith and nondiscrimination./d, at 65,245 N.W.2d at 826. Relying on Almquist, the city contends that the court of appeals erred in concluding that the legislature's failure to explicitly authorize the road unit connection charge in the tax statute was an "explicit expression" of its intent to withhold such authority. Country Joe, 548 N.W.2d at 284. To the contrary, the city asserts that not only is the construction of roads to meet new development needs reasonably related to the welfare of its citizens, see Minn. Stat. § 412.221, subd. 32, but also the implied authority to finance such construction can be derived from the Municipal Planning Act, see id. § 462.351, as well as from the city's authority to make public improvements under Minn. Stat. § 429.021, subd. 1 and Minn. Stat. § 412.221, subd. 6. Finally, the city cites a Virginia case in arguing that the "authority to finance public activity is implicit in [the] author/ty to undertake it[.]" ~n Tidewater As~'n of Homebuilders, [nc. v. City of ?irginia Beach, the Virginia Supreme Court rejected the contention of an association of contractors that statutory authorization for a $200 million water project alone was insufficient and that "the financing mechanism or fee chosen by the City must be authorized separately * * *." 24I Va. 114, 118,400 S.E.2d 523,526 (1991). The court noted, In order to exercise the duty and authority to provide a water system then, the corresponding ability to pay for the system must exist. We agree with the trial court that the ability to finance the cost of providing this service is inherent in the authority to provide it, and the specific mechanism chosen by the City to finance the project need not be defined by statute. M. at 119, 400 S.E.2d at 526. We agree that 2Vaegete and AlmquisI broadly define a city's ability to plan for the use of property within its borders. That the/vlunicipal Planning Act expressly confers broad municipal _planning powers on cities does not necessarily imply that the legislature similarly intended to confer broad financing powers under the act. In fact, the legislature's actions support the opposite conclusion. Although the legislature expressly provided for the sewer and water charges after which the city patterned its road unit connecti'on charge, see Minn. Stat. § 444.075, subd. 3, it failed to provide such authorization for a road charge. That this lack of express statutory authorization was not the result of legislative oversight is evidenced by statutory provisions expressly establishing special assessments as the mechanism by which cities are empowered to finance road improvements. See Minn. Stat. §§ 429.021, subd. 1(1'), 412.22t, subd. 6. The Virginia court's decision in Tidewater is thus readily distinguishable. [3] In Tidewater, the court noted that the Virginia legislature provided nofimding mechanism at all for the water project, which it had authorized. 241 Va. at 119, 400 S.E.2d at 526. In contrast, the Minnesota legislature has specifically provided a funding mechanism for road improvements; therefore, no-funding mechanism need be implied to effectuate the legislative grant of authority to undertake road improvemems. Cf. Naegele, 281 Milm. at 503-04, 162 N.W.2d at 215 (holding that the power to amortize noncontbrming uses must