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'1 <br /> I <br /> <br />cause. Too ofte~ public officials regard real estate devest, ~y <br />itself, as ~c 9rowth. Use of ~ublic dollars to assist real estate <br />deve~nt does ~erve to redistribute ~owth. But in sc~ne cases it may <br />prcmo~ umustair~ ~e 9ro~. <br /> <br />I ~.tsks of catflict of interest and ccrruption are too high. Any <br /> l~"lic 'officials are in~lved in prow'c~ng financial ~ssistance ~une <br /> <br />I <br />I <br />I <br /> <br />I <br />I <br />I <br />I <br />I <br />I <br />I <br />I <br />I <br />I <br />I <br /> <br />private real estate development, risks of oonflict of interest and <br />o0xr~tion are present. The absence of any major problem so far should <br />not delude the State Legislature (as the maj~ body establishin9 rules <br />f~r city government) into thirking that ~otential f~r scamgal is ~ot <br />present. ~ith millions of dol_~-~s in ~ublic assistanoe bein9 offered, <br />businesses star~ to gain or lose large profits, dependirg upon w~ther <br />they are awarded assistance. ~e hea%y involvement of city goverr~nts <br />in real estate assistance is relatively recent. Therefore, s~m- types <br />of risks--whid~ have been present historically in other situations <br />involving public officials an~ private interests--ere now discernable in <br />the real estate area, too. Fo~ example, is it likely that firms which <br />stand to gain finar~ially from real estate projects will become major <br />contributc~s to t~e election cami~ig~ of city officials? Or, is it <br />likely that these firms woA!d be future scurces of ~loyment for city <br />official- and their staffs? Would either of those possibilities affect <br />the independence of the officials ar~ their staffs as they act on <br />pro~o~d real estate projects? <br /> <br />Citizens: confidence that 9overmmmt is ..w3xkin9 for each of them may be <br />undexmined. ~he current role of city ~Dverrm~ts in providi~ <br />assistance to real estate developments is new. It differs from <br />traditional government z~ulaticn and public wc~ks. The cc~plexity and <br />obscurity inly. rent in existirg real estate assistar~e progr~.~ make it <br />difficult for citizer~ to have a clear view of w~D is receiving what. <br />At the s~m~_ time those ir~ividu~ls ar~ groups with an ecc~cmic interest <br />in de~alol~ent subsidies play central roles in local ~olitical activity. <br /> <br />Gonse~y, citizen confidence that officials are de~otin9 their <br />energies to activities ~f general benefit may be unden~. <br /> <br />~he above-listed flaws, while detailed, represent a need to c~rge, not <br />discard, the practice of providing city assistance for private real estate <br />devest. Moreover, as can be seen from the recc~er~latioas which folly, <br />~m envision mainly d~ar~ir~ inoentives, not imposi~ a set of restrictive <br />regulatic~s. <br /> <br />If lXoperly directed, a mw set of incentives can assure that: (a) public <br />assim is distrit~ted ~a7 selectively, only to the projects with real <br />and potential public benefit, (b) taxpayers are informed of the <br />distribution of burde~ an~ benefit f~. the public assistance, (c) elected <br />officials are held accountable fox their actions, (d) officials will ne~3otiate <br />firmly, giving as .much assistance as is needed, not more, (e) overhead expense <br />is minimi~, (f) risks of coaflict of interest and c~rruption are reduced, <br />(g) citizen confider~e that government ser~.s the broad 1oublic interest, not <br />narrow private interests, is enlmm~ed. <br /> <br /> <br />