Agenda - Council - 05/28/1985 - Laserfiche WebLink

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I I I I ! I I I I i I I This interpretation is supported by s significant difference in wording between section 115A,921 and the preceding section, 115A,919. which gives a similar authority to counties. Section 115A.919 states clearly that the revenues "shall be used only for" certain purposes. Section 115A.921 contains no such statement addressed to the eligible purposes of local expenditures. Because the two provisions were enacted simultaneously, this clear difference in wording must be presumed to indicate some difference in legislative intent and--by the usual canons of statutory construction--be given some effect. Thus it is possible to conclude that section 115A.921 has no bearing on how the city spends the dollars, this being a matter for the city to decide within the limits of the city code and charter. This seems to me a defensible interpretation of the statutory language, Although this is a defensible interpretation of section 115A.921 based purely on the statutory language, from what I know of the legislative history it is not a correct interpretation of the legislative intent. Extrinsic evidence suggests that the purpose statement is in fact addressed not to why the fee is authorized but rather how the city may spend the money. If this interpretation is accepted, two subsidiary questions arise: (a) Does the section expand the purposes for which the city can spend from its general fund? (b) Does the section limit the purposes for which the city can spend these funds? As to the first of these two issues, I do not believe that section 115A.921 was intended or can be read to expand city authority generally--to give the city authority to spend from its general fund in ways or for purposes it does not already have within its power, If the city does not already have the authority in the city code or by charter to make these expenditures, then it does not have it by virtue of section 115A.921. So, for example, if the city could not expend from its general fund to pay medical bills of citizens injured by the landfill, then it does not have the authority to do so under section 115A.921. The answer to this first question--does the city have the authority in the city code or by charter to expend money for each of these purposes?--is a question for the city attorney to answer. If the city does possess the authority, by general statute or by charter, to make these expenditures, then the question becomes whether section 115A.921 limits the valid expenditures. The bare words of the statute are, of course, very broad; "mitigating and compensating for . . . adverse effects" would not on their face preclude expenditure for any of the purposes contemplated, assuming those purposes are otherwise within the city's power. I think, however, that it is fairly clear from the legislative history and related statutes that this phrase was not intended by the legislature to be interpreted so broadly. This is supported by the significant difference in wording between section 115A.921 and the preceding section relating to counties. The counties are authorized in section 115A.919 to spend for the following purposes: landfill abatement, closure and post-closure care, response actions, and for mitigating and compensating for adverse effects. Section 115A.921, by contrast, refers only to the last of these purposes. I conclude from this contrast that the legislature did not intend that cities would spend the money for abatement, closure or post-closure care, or response actions. (Expenditures in these categories would include landfill abatement programs, landfill cleanup, monitoring and testing, relocation expenses, actions at the site to confine or repair damage, covering the site or installing diversion structures, and -2-