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Page '2- August 10, 2004 <br /> <br />Z.B. <br /> <br /> Signs -- Billboard company says sign code illegally restricts <br /> noncommercial speech <br /> <br /> Argues sign code is consequently void <br /> Citation: Coral.Springs Streer Sys-te. ms Inc. v. CiO, of Sunrise, ]]~h U.S. Circuit <br /> Court of Appeals, No. 03-11497 <br /> The ]] th Circuit has jttrisdicfion over Alabama, Florida, and Georgia. <br /> FLORIDA (06/07/04) -- Coral Springs Street Systems constructed billboards <br /> on real estate it bought or' leased. <br /> Through another party, it entered into a contract with a car dealership to <br /> erect a pole sign overlooldng a busy expressway. <br /> However, several provisions of the agreement violated t~e local sign code· <br /> Among other things, pole signs were prohibited and only one sign could be <br /> erected on each piece of property. Since the car dealership already had a sign, <br /> the construction of another clearly violated the code. <br /> Coral Springs applied for a permit to erect an off-premises outdoor adver- <br />· rising sign on a pole. At the top of the pole, Coral Springs intended to place a <br /> two-sided, illuminated, 672-square-foot sign face. <br /> The city denied the application, finding the proposed sign violated the sign <br /> code in several places, namely those regulating offsite signs. <br /> Coral Springs sued, arguing the sign code was void because its restrictions <br /> unconstitutionally prohibited offsite noncommercial speech, such as .political <br /> signs, along with offsite commercial speech. The court ruled in its favor. <br /> The city appealed. <br /> DECISION: Reversed. <br /> The sign code did not impermissibly restrict noncommercial speech. <br /> Coral Springs tried to characterize the different treatment of onsite and <br /> offsite signs a~ an impermissible restriction on noncommercial speech. The <br /> sign code distinguished between onsite commercial and offsite commercial <br /> advertising, but made no reference to noncommercial speech. Thus, Coral <br /> Springs argued these restrictions applied to noncommercial speech as well. <br /> According to local law, noncommercial messages were by definition onsite <br /> signs. Therefore, the onsite/offsite restrictions did not effect noncommercial <br /> speech, since no matter their location, they were considered onsite signs. An <br /> idea, unlike a product, could be viewed as located wherever the idea ,,vas <br /> pressed, that is, wherever the speaker was located. Consequently, the restric- <br /> tions on offsite advertising signs did not include noncommercial speech. <br /> see also: Cidzens ~or Responsible Government < Davidson, ,.~d F. 3d ]174 <br /> (2000) <br /> see olso: F!oHda Outdoor .4dve;ri~ing, LLC v. City of Boyn. ron Beach, , ~ <br /> <br />80 <br /> <br />2004 :,Su~nian ?'miisiqing '}roup. any 'eproduc:lon :s prot~biteci. ?or more information ptease ,sail 1617/ 542-0048. <br /> <br /> <br />