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5 !~ert"a stockholder", "presidenff', "partner", er other description of the nature of the per- sonal financial' interest of the official in the contract. If the official does business as an individual under his own name, clause no. 4 may be omitted. . Comment This affidavit must be filed with the city clerk before payment of the claim is made. !t re. ay be acknowledged by a notary public, the city clerk, or any other officer qualified under the law to administer oaths. PART II. CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN NON-CONTRACT SITUATIONS General Rule What is a Disqualifying interest While the statuto~'y rules discussed thus far relate only to contracts with interested officials, courts throughout the country, including the Minnesota Supreme Court, have foltowed a similar principle in non-~ontract situations even in the absence of statute. Any official who has a personal pecuniary interest that may conflict with the pub- :lc interest in considering an official action is genel~tly disqualified from participating in he ~.c:ion. This is especially true where the question to be voted on concerns the member's own char- ~..,:.~er or conduct or his right to hold office or wh~re his own personal pecuniary interest is so !mmediat~, particular, and distinct from the public in~erest that he cannot be expected to represent the public interest fairly in deciding the matter at issue. (62 C.J.S., Municipal-Corpora- riens, Sec.-402, p. 76~: 56 Am. Jut. 2d, Municipal Corporations, Sec. 142.) ' ln'appiying the disqualification rules in non- con:ract situations, the courts have sometimes made a distinction between judicial and quasi- judicial acts on the one hand and legislative and administrative acts on the other, but this distinc- tion has not been consistently applied in-particular :ase.a. In general, when an act of a council is ]udicial, no member who has a personal financial interest may take part, and some courts would hold that his participation makes the decision 'voidable even if his vote was not necessary to make up the majority necessary for decision. See i33 A.L.R. 1257, 1260. Sum0 of the illustra- tive cases included in the next section indicate how this distinction has been applied in practice. When there is such a disqualifing personal interest, the action is not necessarily void, however. in .contrast to the rules regarding conflict of interest as applied to contracts, the official action may still be taken validly if the disqualified of- ficial does not participate, and the action is ap- proved by tim requisite number of non-interested votes. Many difficult questions of fact arise in these cases, particularly with reference to the nature of a disqualifying interest, and it is impossible to make a simple generalization that covers ali cases. The Minnesota Supreme Court has listed five factors which should be considered in termi.n~ng if'~here is a..disqualifying interest in these situations: .. 1. The nature of the' decision being made. 2. The nature of the pecuniary interest. 3. The number of interested officials. 4. The need, if any, for interested officials .to make the decision. · · .5. Other means available, if any, such as an ~opportunity for review of the decision. (Lenz ~. Coon Creek Watershed District, 278' Minn. 1,153 N.W. 2d 209, 1967.) There is far from complete agreement among the various courts on the kinds of interest and the situations that prevent an interested official from taking part in particular official actions. · A review of some of'these, may give some clue to judicial attitudes in particular factual situations: 1. Determination of official's right to office or l~abtfity. On the theory that no man should the judge of his own cause, courts have generally held that an officer may not participate in pro- ceedings involving his own status or liability. Thus, members of a city commission trying them- selves or other members for an offense in which a majority of the commission illegally participated are within a constitutional prohibition ~hat judges may' not sit in cases in which they ar, interested. and their judgment is void. (State ex rel. La Crosse v. A~,ertll, 110 S.W. 2d 1173 Tex. Civ. App. 1937.) lhis principle is s° well established with reference to judicial and quasi-judicial acts that the court would doubtless have reached the same conclusion had there been no constitutional or statutory provision on the subject. Similarly, in' Rollins ~. Conner, 74 N.H. 456, 169 Ad. 777 (1918), where a council member's election was challenged, the challenged member was held .disqualified to participate in a council decision m the election contest. Likewise the Wisconsin court once held that county board members who were sureties on an official bOnd could not vote on a resolution relieving the sure-